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 To the reader: 
While financial reporting is a central activity of firms, it is often studied with simple 
monocausal explanations in mind. Yet, we know that financial reporting and accounting 
choices are not only influenced by managerial incentives to provide a certain picture to capital 
providers or to optimize its direct cash flow consequences. In reality, market 
interdependencies factor into accounting choices. Also, managers act idiosyncratically and 
existing owners have varying demand for transparency and comparability. 
The dissertation thesis of Jochen Pierk looks into three specific issues that are good examples 
for this inter-relatedness of accounting behavior. The first study, exploring the accounting 
choices of German firms in the regulated gas utility industry, investigates a product-market 
effect on accounting choice. The second paper tries to understand the impact of a managerial 
behavioral bias, overconfidence, on earnings management around managerial turnover. The 
third paper studies whether existing institutional investors prefer financial reporting to be 
geared towards transparency or comparability around initial public offerings. 
All three studies enhance our understanding of the determinants of accounting choice. In the 
first and third paper, Jochen has succeeded in identifying well-suited settings that allow him 
to study unique aspects of accounting behavior. The second paper uses an established 
approach to measure overconfidence and a relative clean setting to identify earnings 
management behavior. We learn that firms clearly adjust their reporting strategies if product 
market regulation presents them with an incentive to do so. Overconfident managers are less 
likely to engage in big bath accounting and existing investors of smaller firms seem to care 
more about comparability than about transparency per se. 
These findings are relevant because they help us to understand how complex accounting 
choices are. They might be driven by market interdependencies, heterogeneous investor bases 
or simply by the nature of the CEO or CFO. For the cross-section of firms, most likely all 
these alternative explanations will be true for some but not for all firms. Thus, predicting the 
overall accounting choices of the complete universe of (public) firms (world-wide) is deemed 
to be a more or less futile attempt. Thus, Jochen should be complemented for his decision to 
focus on specific firms in specific settings. I hope that his studies will be widely read and 
used. 
Berlin, November 10, 2014 
Joachim Gassen  
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 An Introductionary Summary 
Three Essays on Accounting Choice 
The objective of financial accounting is to provide useful information to meet 
heterogeneous demand (Ball, 2001). What exactly useful means depends on the respective 
user of the information. Financial accounting provides pre-decision value relevant 
information to outsiders and aligns post-decision stakeholder incentives in contracts (Beaver 
and Demski, 1979). To see accounting thereby as a mechanical measurement system is clearly 
inappropriate. Accounting rules contain discretion regarding the measurement of economic 
events and often require judgment, e.g. about the likelihood that a certain event will occur or 
not occur. Managers have incentives to use these leeways in their favor to maximize their own 
utility. Thus, research in financial accounting tries to understand the nature of these incentives 
and their impact on the objectives of accounting.  
Accounting research can be divided into positive and normative accounting theory. 
Historically, accounting academics tried to develop and justify accounting rules and asked the 
normative question how accounting should be. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) are among the 
first to systematically describe positive accounting theory which addresses the question how 
accounting systems work and how we can predict their outcomes. The authors refer to the 
early and very influential paper of Ball and Brown (1968), often considered as the start of 
positive accounting theory. Ball and Brown (1968) show empirically that information 
contained in the annual income number is useful for capital market participants. Since then, 
the number of empirical archival papers exploring the hypotheses of positive accounting 
theory in leading accounting journals has increased and the number of qualitative paper has 
decreased. Today, only a minority of published papers is of normative nature (Oler et al., 
2010).  
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 Positive accounting theory, on the one hand, tries to explain what influences 
managers’ decision to use certain accounting rules and, on the other hand, to explain how the 
accounting outcome affects all kind of stakeholders using this information system. This 
dissertation sheds further light on the first aspect. What is the managers’ incentive structure to 
influence the accounting outcome? The first paper thereby shows that managers early adopt a 
new accounting regime if accounting numbers are used by regulators to set prices in utility 
industries. The second paper argues that personal characteristics of managers influence the 
reporting behavior around CEO turnover. Finally, the third paper investigates reporting 
choices in European exchange-regulated markets. Thus, all papers give new insights into 
determinants of reporting behavior of managers.  
The first paper ‘Unintended Regulatory Consequences after Adoption of a new 
Accounting Regime‘ investigates the interplay between a revised accounting regime and price 
regulation in the European utility industry. The paper is coauthored with Matthias Weil, a 
former doctoral student of the accounting group.  
The European Commission requires all member states of the European Union to 
establish national regulators that set prices in utility industries. In particular, the study first 
shows that firms from the German gas utility industry are more likely than other German 
firms to voluntarily adopt a revised accounting regime early, thereby opportunistically 
influencing regulated prices. In a second step, we estimate the overall effect on prices in the 
gas utility industry. The study is related to Watts and Zimmerman (1978) who argue that 
firms engage in earnings management to influence regulatory outcomes. 
In Germany, the introduction of new German-GAAP coincides with a cost audit for 
revenue caps of the gas utility industry for the regulation period 2013 to 2017. Firms that 
choose to voluntarily early adopt new German GAAP in 2009 can influence average values 
(e.g. regulatory equity) of the year of the cost audit 2010.  
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 Based on a full-text search in the German Electronic Federal Gazette we identify all 
early adopters and show that firms from the utility industry are over-represented. Based on the 
early adoption in combination with the publicly available calculation scheme of revenue caps 
we estimate that early adoption leads to discounted profits on average of between € 775k and 
€ 1,623k. Further, we illustrate that it is not beneficial for all firms to early adopt new German 
GAAP. Cross-sectional results indicate that non-adopters from the utility industry have less 
discretion to increase future revenue caps.  
Next, we argue that the introduction of the new accounting regime has an 
economically significant impact on revenues. Early adopters influence year-beginning and 
year-end values of the respective balance-sheet items since the cost audit was in 2010 and 
firms early adopted in 2009. Non-adopters only influence year-end values since adoption was 
mandatory in 2010. The total increase in revenue based on early adopters and non-adopters is 
estimated between 6.40 and 13.60 Euro per household within the regulation period 2013 to 
2017.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature regarding industry specific regulation 
(e.g. Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; Key, 1997; Paek, 2001; Omonuk, 2007; Gill-de-Albornoz and 
Illueca, 2005) by analyzing the interplay of financial reporting decisions and price regulation 
in the German utility industry. This interplay is caused by a EU regulation which is effective 
in all 28 member states. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide 
direct evidence of regulatory consequences after the adoption of a new accounting regime. 
The second paper ‘Big Bath Accounting – The Bright Side of Managerial 
Overconfidence’ is coauthored with Valentin Burg and Tobias Scheinert, both doctoral 
students from the corporate finance group at Humboldt University. The paper empirically 
investigates the interplay between a specific managerial characteristic, overconfidence, and 
the decision to take an earnings bath following CEO turnover. An earnings bath is commonly 
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 known as the decision to write-off large amounts to shift earnings to the future. This behavior 
is especially observed in the context of a CEO change. Incoming CEOs use large write-offs 
and attribute the losses to their predecessors (e.g. Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002). 
We hypothesize and find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in such a 
big bath behavior. Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability and consequently believe 
that the company's projects will realize higher earnings in the future when these projects are 
managed by them. Therefore, they are likely to believe that they will reach their earnings 
targets regardless of a potential big bath. CEOs face a trade-off between costs (e.g. increased 
SEC scrutiny, providing additional information, labor market consequences) and benefits of 
earnings management. Since overconfident CEOs place a lower value on the benefits of 
engaging in big bath accounting, we expect to find a negative relationship between 
overconfident CEOs and the probability to take a big bath.  
Our measure of overconfidence is based on Malmendier and Tate (2005) and uses 
managers' stock option portfolios following Yermack (1995) and Hall and Liebman (1998). 
Managers are either classified as overconfident or as rational. The idea of this methodology is 
that managers typically are poorly diversified and should exercise executive options as soon 
as possible in order to reduce their exposure to firm-specific risk. Therefore, we classify 
CEOs as overconfident if they ever hold an option until maturity which is at least 40 percent 
in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity.  
Our findings suggest that overconfident managers are less likely to engage in big bath 
accounting. Big bath is measured as write-offs in form of special items following Elliott and 
Shaw (1988). We address potential endogeneity issues in several ways, e.g. by controlling for 
the turnover type (routine vs. non-routine), by modeling the choice to hire an overconfident 
manager and by accounting for a potential selection of rational CEOs into firms with higher 
big bath potential. The paper advances our understanding of managerial behavior around CEO 
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 turnover and further contributes to the growing literature of managerial overconfidence in 
financial accounting.  
The third paper ‘Reporting Choices of Firms in European Exchange-Regulated 
Markets’ sheds light on financial reporting decisions in European exchange-regulated 
markets. These markets are not within the scope of Regulation 2002/1606/EC, mandating the 
use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), since they are not a EU-regulated 
market. This means that these firms are not required by the European Commission to use the 
IFRS. Mostly, exchange-regulated markets allow firms to choose between IFRS and local 
GAAP (with the notable exception of AIM London). In particular, the paper investigates 
determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption and voluntary quarterly disclosures in the European 
exchange-regulated markets. 
The sample consists of 226 admissions to the European exchange-regulated markets of 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Paris. The results show that less than 20% of the 
firms voluntarily prepare financial statements in accordance with IFRS and less than 20% 
voluntarily provide quarterly information. Even among the IFRS adopters, 65% do not 
provide quarterly reports.  
Determinant models reveal that the proportion of diversified investors is significantly 
positively related to the probability of using IFRS, but not related to the decision to 
voluntarily report quarterly. This finding could potentially be explained by the relative 
importance of comparability vs. transparency. Firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS now use the 
same set of rules as firms of EU-regulated markets. It might be that diversified investors 
benefit more from comparable financial statements than non-diversified investors since the 
same set of rules potentially reduces costs of managing their portfolio.  
Furthermore, Maffett (2012) shows that institutional investors prefer opaque firms as 
they benefit from privately informed trading. This is consistent with the finding of the paper 
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 that diversified investors are not more interested in quarterly reporting than non-diversified 
investors. 
The third paper contributes to the literature by examining reporting choices in 
European exchange-regulated markets. Moreover, the paper shows the relationship between 
diversified investors and the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS and voluntary providing 
quarterly financial information.  
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 Unintended Regulatory Consequences after Adoption of a new 
Accounting Regime 
 
Jochen Pierka, Matthias Weila 
 
 
a Humboldt University Berlin, Dorotheenstrasse 1, 10117 Berlin, Germany 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper empirically investigates regulatory consequences after the adoption of a new 
accounting regime. Specifically, we analyze the impact on revenues in the price-regulated 
European utility industry by investigating the regulatory effects of the adoption of a revised 
accounting regime in Germany. Firm-specific revenue caps are determined during a financial 
statement-based cost audit. We find that regulated firms are more likely than non-regulated 
firms to voluntarily adopt new German GAAP early, thereby achieving higher regulated 
revenues. Manually analyzing financial statements, we are able to estimate the increase in 
firm-specific allowed revenues for the regulation period 2013 to 2017. Our paper shows cash-
flow consequences as the result of an accounting regime change and thus contributes to the 
understanding of possible regulatory consequences of new accounting regimes. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Incentive-regulation, price-regulation, German GAAP, IFRS for SME, 
governmental intervention 
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 1. Introduction 
The consequences of the adoption of a new accounting regime are of interest for 
regulators and researchers alike. A focus of recent studies was the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world. Researchers mostly 
focused their attention on capital market consequences of publicly traded firms. In contrast, 
with the exception of the banking sector (e.g. Bushman and Landsman, 2010; Gebhardt and 
Novotney-Farkas, 2011), little is known about consequences in regard to industry specific 
regulations. The introduction of a new accounting regime can trigger unintended 
consequences if industry-specific regulations are linked to financial reporting. Thus, knowing 
and understanding these interplays is crucial for regulators and standard setters. In order to 
contribute to the understanding of regulatory consequences of financial accounting, we are 
interested in the introduction of a new accounting regime and price-regulation of utilities. We 
hypothesize that in a setting where regulated prices are directly linked to accounting numbers, 
managers use discretion upon adoption of a new accounting regime to increase regulated 
prices. Thus, unintended consequences may occur. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on the consequences of the 
introduction of a new accounting regime on industry specific regulations. Even the extensive 
literature on IFRS adoption is not addressing this issue (Brüggemann et al., 2013). A stream 
of literature related to our study is based on the governmental intervention argument by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978) where companies engage in earnings management to get favorable 
regulation or to avoid non-favorable regulation (e.g. Jones, 1991; Cahan, 1992; Key, 1997; 
Paek, 2001; Omonuk, 2007; Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca, 2005). The underlying assumption 
of these studies is that the regulator is not (fully) able to anticipate earnings management of 
these firms.  
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 Our study is different from those studies in several important ways. First, in the above 
mentioned studies the regulation might only be affected if the adoption of a new accounting 
regime coincides with an investigation period. Thus, there might be no immediate effect of 
earnings management. Furthermore, even when the accounting change falls within an 
investigation period, it is unclear whether the regulatory outcome is affected as the regulator 
might be aware that the underlying economics have not changed. In contrast, our study 
investigates regulatory consequences in a setting where regulated prices are directly linked to 
accounting numbers. Second, most former studies use accrual expectation models to analyze 
the link between regulation and accounting. This likely introduces errors because accruals are 
classified as being abnormal (normal) when they are normal (abnormal). We directly observe 
discretionary choices by managers. Thus, our study is not exposed to such estimation errors. 
Third, empirical evidence on the interplay of accounting choice in regulated settings indicates 
that regulated firms manage earnings in order to increase shareholder wealth. However, 
evidence regarding the success of earnings management is vague and in most cases not 
quantifiable (Fields et al., 2001). We are able to estimate cash-flow consequences resulting 
from the adoption of a new accounting regime and thus provide regulatory consequences in a 
more direct way.  
To test our hypothesis, we investigate industry-specific regulatory consequences in a 
European setting. Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 1  of the European Commission 
require EU member states to establish national regulators who fix or approve tariffs in the gas 
and electricity utility market. The main goal of this governmental intervention is to ensure 
low prices and high quality supply at the same time. The most common system used by 
national regulators to achieve this goal is the incentive-regulation (e.g. in Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy, Spain and Belgium). Incentive-regulation refers to price or revenue caps in 
1 Directive 2003/54/EC (2003/55/EC) of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity (natural gas) and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (98/30/EC). 
 
 
11 
                                                 
 combination with an efficiency component. We test our hypothesis in a German setting 
because we can use the (early) adoption of new German GAAP 
(Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, BilMoG) as a clearly identifiable and economic relevant 
accounting choice.  
In Germany, revenue caps for the gas utility industry for the regulation period 2013 to 
2017 are based on a cost audit in 2010. The revenue caps comprise specific operational 
expenses incurred in 2010 plus a fixed percentage of return on average equity (ROAE). The 
relevant values are based on accounts that have to be prepared in accordance with German 
GAAP. New recognition and valuation principles affect the calculation of revenue caps in 
various ways.  
Companies have to comply with new German GAAP2 from 2010 on. Since the cost 
audit was in 2010, year-end values of the respective balance sheet items (e.g. equity) are 
affected. Early adoption of new German GAAP was allowed for financial years starting in 
2009. Companies choosing to adopt new German GAAP early had the opportunity to increase 
their revenues by influencing average values of 2010 (e.g. equity). Early adoption increases 
the total effect since in this case year-beginning values are affected as well. We first show that 
managers opportunistically chose early adoption to increase future regulated prices. Next, we 
estimate the overall effect on the economy based on early and non-early adopters. 
We manually identify voluntary adopters of new German GAAP using a full-text 
search in the German Electronic Federal Gazette (Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger). This 
procedure yields a sample of 344 voluntary adopters. We find clear evidence that regulated 
firms are more likely to adopt BilMoG early than other companies. Manually analyzing 
financial statements we are able to estimate specific changes that influence revenue caps. We 
use this data and the publicly available calculation scheme for revenue caps to directly 
2 We label German GAAP before BilMoG as old German GAAP (HGB-Old). German GAAP after BilMoG is 
referred to as new German GAAP (HGB). 
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 estimate the effect of early adoption. The estimated increase in revenues for the five-year 
regulation period results in a discounted profit (by inflation) on average of between € 775k 
and € 1,623k. Deflated by book value of equity of 2008, the profit is on average between 
16.5% and 34.6%. Additional costs only arise from accounting-related efforts regarding the 
early adoption.  
We further observe that not all companies of the incentive-regulated gas industry 
adopted new German GAAP early. We find that for non-adopters an early adoption of new 
German GAAP would have allowed less discretion to increase future revenue caps. For some 
firms, the changes upon adoption would have even decreased future prices. We conclude that 
for these companies the changes in future revenues do not justify the costs of early adoption. 
Overall, the introduction of new Geman GAAP has an economically significant 
impact. We estimate that both early and non-early adopters from the gas utility industry 
increase revenues between 260 and 540 million Euro within the period from 2013 until 2017. 
Converted to a per household effect the increase is between 6.40 and 13.60 Euro.3 
It could be argued that the regulator is aware of GAAP changes and anticipates this in 
the calculation of revenues. We argue that there is multiple evidence, apart from our results, 
that firms early adopted to increase future prices. We could not find any indication that the 
changes were anticipated by the regulator. Also, there is anecdotal evidence that firms early 
adopted to increase future prices (by talking to a CFO of an early adopting firm). 
Furthermore, even auditing firms and specialized consultants advised firms to early adopt in 
order to increase regulatory equity (Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2009; Breuer and Mayer, 2010).  
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we contribute to the 
understanding of economic consequences of a new accounting regime. We describe the 
interplay between prices and accounting figures in the German utility industries caused by a 
3 The effect of the electricity industry is not included. Thus, the overall effect of the gas and electricity utility 
industries is likely to be bigger. We do not include firms from the electricity industry since the cost audit in 2011 
was unaffected by early adoption of new German GAAP in 2009. 
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 EU regulation, which is affective in all 28 member states. We find that managers use early 
adoption of new German GAAP opportunistically to increase prices. Second, while extant 
literature only provides indication of possible industry-specific regulatory consequences of 
accounting choice, we provide economic consequences in a direct way. Using hand collected 
data from the notes; we are able to directly estimate cash flow changes attributable to the 
adoption of new German GAAP.  
Our results are especially important for standard setters, which intend to introduce a 
new accounting regime. In July 2009, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
published the International Financial Reporting Standards for small and medium-sized 
companies (IFRS for SMEs, IASB, 2009). The consultation of the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2010) as well as the academic debate does not fully address all 
possible consequences of a new accounting regime. We argue that the current debate of the 
IASB to expand the IFRS to private firms is incomplete and unintended consequences will 
occur. New German GAAP is, according to the objectives of the German Federal Parliament, 
comparable to IFRS (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
literature on regulatory consequences of accounting choice. Next, we explain the institutional 
background of the accounting environment in Germany and of price-regulation in the German 
gas and electricity utility industry. Section 3 contains the development of our hypotheses. In 
Section 4 we describe the sample selection and research design. We empirically investigate 
accounting choice of price-regulated firms in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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 2. Related Literature and Institutional Setting 
2.1 Related Literature 
We are not aware of any studies that examine the interplay between the adoption of a 
new accounting regime and industry-specific regulation, with the exception of the banking 
sector. A stream of literature related to our research question investigates the interplay 
between accounting choice and industry-specific regulation. Most of this stream is related to 
the political cost hypothesis. If earnings of specific companies are likely to be influenced by 
governmental intervention, managers have the incentive to adjust their earnings to avoid or 
influence governmental interference. The influence thereby could be indirect because 
earnings seem to be “excessive” (potential future regulation) or directly through existing 
regulation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Many studies focus on specific settings or 
industries. Jones (1991) observes income decreasing earnings management during import 
relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission. A comparable 
incentive is also documented for antitrust investigations (Cahan, 1992). D’Souza (1998) finds 
that managers of companies from the rate-regulated U.S. electricity industry use more cost 
inflating assumptions under SFAS 106 to maximize current rate recoveries if they face higher 
uncertainties about their future ability to recover costs. Paek (2001) documents income 
decreasing accruals in the context of the U.S. rate-regulated electricity industry. Omonuk 
(2007) finds evidence that managers of electricity firms reduce earnings in the year they file 
for rate increases. Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005) document that Spanish electricity 
companies reduce earnings after price tariffs are introduced.  
Our study relates to a stream of literature, which analyzes economic consequences of 
accounting method changes in the context of IFRS adoption. Many of these studies find 
positive capital market effects around IFRS adoption (e.g. Leuz and Verrechia, 2000; Daske 
et al., 2008; DeFond et al., 2011). Although industry-specific regulatory consequences are 
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 also likely to occur in this setting, we are not aware of any study analyzing such consequences 
around IFRS adoption (Brüggemann et al., 2013). 
Direct evidence on economic consequences in regulated settings is vague and in most 
cases not quantifiable. Consequently, in their overview article on empirical research regarding 
accounting choice, Fields et al. (2001: 299) criticize the fact that “research results fail to 
provide compelling evidence of the implications of alternative accounting methods and we 
recommend more efforts to determine the nature of such implications. The literature provides 
ample circumstantial evidence that accounting choice matters but little direct evidence”.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate managerial incentives to 
adopt an accounting regime stemming from price-regulation in the European Union. 
Furthermore, in contrast to past studies which provide only indications of economic 
consequences, we are able to estimate direct cash flow consequences in a regulated setting. To 
illustrate the role of regulatory consequences after adoption of a new accounting regime, it is 
crucial to show the magnitude of economic consequences instead of only indicating them. Our 
setting allows us to address regulatory consequences of accounting choice in a more direct 
way compared to prior studies.  
2.2 Institutional Setting 
2.2.1 Accounting Environment in Germany 
Irrespective of their listing status all German limited liability partnerships and 
corporations have to prepare individual financial statements in accordance with German 
GAAP (§ 264 and § 264a HGB). Individual financial statements are the basis for a wide range 
of contractual claims, e.g. dividends, tax payments, interests, salaries and regulatory issues 
(Ball et al., 2000). Therefore, even for publicly listed companies which are required to use 
IFRS, individual financial statements prepared in accordance with German GAAP play an 
important role. 
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 Former German GAAP was considered a prudent accounting regime with low 
disclosure levels (e.g. Saudagaran and Biddle, 1992; Leuz and Verecchia, 2000). 
Consequently, financial statements prepared under German GAAP were criticized as less 
informative than those prepared in accordance with IFRS (e.g. Weißenberger et al., 2004). 
Overall, former German GAAP less focused on addressing information asymmetries between 
managers and owners. Instead, it was used as a contracting device with external stakeholders.  
As a response to this critique, in May 2009 the German legislature passed the biggest 
change in German accounting regulation in the last 25 years. Besides a deregulation of 
accounting for micro-firms, new German GAAP aims to provide more informative financial 
statements (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2007). Consequently, the link between financial 
and tax accounting was reduced and optional accounting principles were abolished. Many 
changes lead to a less prudent accounting regime and increased book values of equity. Equity 
increasing revaluations could affect both assets and liabilities.4 Furthermore, new German 
GAAP requires several new disclosures, e.g. related party disclosures, a detailed description 
of off-balance-sheet transactions and a schedule of audit and non-audit fees. Most changes 
push German GAAP towards IFRS, whereas some concepts are even adopted from IFRS (e.g. 
identification of special purpose entities, determination of deferred taxes, main principles of 
hedge accounting, determination of related parties). New German GAAP is applicable for 
financial years beginning in 2010. Voluntary adoption was possible for financial years 
starting in 2009 (article 66 (3) EGHGB5). The changes of BilMoG do not affect the tax base 
because tax specific regulation offsets these changes.  
2.2.2 Price-Regulation in the European Utility Industry 
Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 2003/55/EC require EU member states to 
establish a national regulator for utility networks. The regulators should fix or approve tariffs 
4 Appendix A presents key changes and their effects on book equity. 
5 Introductory Act to the German Commercial Code. 
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 in the gas and electricity market. To further push the full liberalization of the European gas 
and electricity market and to regulate generation, transmission, distribution and supply of gas 
and electricity, Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC were replaced by 
Directives2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC 6 . Member states must ensure non-
discriminatory and cost-reflecting prices by granting gas network operators incentives to 
increase efficiency. 
The composition of gas and electricity markets varies in each member state of the 
European Union. Also, national regulators use different methods to ensure efficient pricing. 
Historically, the most common systems were the cost-plus regulation, the incentive-regulation 
and the yardstick-regulation. The cost-plus regulation guarantees to cover operational 
expenses plus a profit margin. The Netherlands, for example, use the yardstick-regulation 
where prices are linked to the costs of a peer group, not an individual benchmark. Prices are 
not allowed to exceed the mean of the costs of the peergroup.  
Incentive-regulation refers to price or revenue caps in combination with an efficiency 
component. The efficiency component is based on a benchmark mechanism and incentivizes 
regulated companies to work cost-efficiently. The goal of incentive-regulations is to achieve 
cost reductions by giving regulated companies the incentive to work cost-efficiently. In recent 
years most member states have implemented incentive-regulations (e.g. Germany, the UK, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium). Table 1 shows the methods used and the industry 
composition of the seven biggest economies of the European Union.  
2.2.3 Price-Regulation in the German Gas Utility Industry 
The German gas utility market currently consists of 14 transmission system operators 
(TSO) and approximately 700 distribution system operators (DSO) (International Energy 
6  Directive 2009/72/EC (2009/73/EC) of July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity (natural gas) and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (2003/55/EC). 
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 Agency, 2012). While TSOs transport gas on a national level, DSOs are responsible for 
delivering gas to the ultimate consumer. 
Table 1. Composition of the Gas and Electricity Markets in Selected Countries 
 Transmission Distribution   
Country Gas Electricity Gas Electricity Method Agency 
Germany 14 4 695 866 Incentive-regulation, revenue cap BNetzA 
UK 1 1 18 19 Incentive-regulation, price cap Ofgem 
France 2 1 25 148 Incentive-regulation, revenue cap CRE 
Italy 3 9 263 144 Incentive-regulation, price cap AEEG 
Spain 14 1 22 351 Incentive-regulation, revenue cap CNE 
Netherlands 1 1 10 8 Yardstick method Energiekamer 
Belgium 1 1 18 26 Incentive-regulation, revenue cap CREG 
The table contains the number of regulated gas and electricity companies as well as the national regulation 
agencies for major countries in the EU. The following list contains the full names of the above mentioned 
national regulation agencies. Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und 
Eisenbahnen (BNetzA), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), Commission de Régulation de 
l'Energie (CRE), Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG), La Comisión Nacional de Energía / National 
Energy Commission (CNE), Office of Energy Regulation (Energiekamer), Commission pour la Régulation de 
l'Electricité et du Gaz (CREG). 
In Germany, the German Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA) uses 
an incentive-regulation (Anreizregulierungsverordnung, ARegV) to achieve a further decrease 
in prices in the electricity and gas utility industry. It became effective in 2009 (§ 3 (1) 
ARegV), replacing the former cost-plus regulation. It defines firm-year-specific revenue caps 
for specified regulation periods and includes a benchmarking mechanism. Per unit prices are 
determined by dividing revenue caps by expected quantities sold. If within a year more (less) 
quantities are sold compared to expected values, the difference decreases (increases) the 
revenue cap for the following year. This mechanism ensures that the sum of actual revenues 
equals the sum of revenue caps.  
Costs are only fully covered if companies work efficiently compared to a benchmark 
(§ 4 (1) GasNEV). The first regulation period of the gas industry started in 2009 and ended in 
2012 (§ 34 (1b) ARegV). The second regulation period started in 2013 and will last until 
2017. Each of the subsequent periods will also last five years. Firm-specific revenue caps are 
calculated in the following way (simplified formula). 
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The regulator assumes that there are costs that can be influenced if the utility network 
is operated efficiently and costs that cannot be influenced by the company. Therefore, the 
regulation differentiates between influenceable and non-influenceable costs. Costs that are 
classified as non-influenceable (Cni,t) are included in the revenue cap for every specific year. 
Examples of these costs are certain taxes and grid fees which can be seen as exogenous to the 
choice of managers (§ 11 (2) ARegV). All other operational expenses related to the operation 
of the networks are classified as influenceable costs (§ 11 (3) ARegV). To incentivize firms to 
operate and invest in the utility networks, a return on equity is also added to the influenceable 
costs.  
In order to provide incentives to decrease costs, influenceable costs of the base year 
are compared to benchmark efficiencies. Based on the comparison, influenceable costs are 
divided into efficient and inefficient costs (§ 14 ARegV). The portion of influenceable costs 
that does not exceed the benchmark is classified as efficient costs (Cefficient). Costs exceeding 
the benchmark are classified as inefficient costs (Cinefficient). During the regulation period the 
revenue cap decreases for two reasons. First, efficient and inefficient costs are not fully 
covered due to a general reduction of 1.5% (GRt). The general reduction will reduce revenues 
of all companies irrespective of their individual efficiency level. Second, inefficient costs are 
only partly covered because of an individual inefficiency reduction (IIRt). At the beginning of 
a regulation period the inefficient costs are fully covered but the amount decreases in steps of 
20% to zero within a regulation period. CPI (consumer price index) adjusts for inflation. 
The return on equity is calculated as a return on regulatory equity. The interest rate is 
7.14% for investments before January 1st 2006 and 9.05% for investments thereafter 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2011b). Regulatory equity differs from book value of equity. It is 
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 computed as the average value of network-related property, plant, and equipment (PPE) (§ 7 
(1) GasNEV, §§ 4, 6 (1), 11 ARegV) minus network-related liabilities (§ 7 (2) GasNEV, §§ 4, 
6 (1), 11 ARegV). According to § 6b EnWG the relevant values both of network-related PPE 
and network-related liabilities are based on accounts that have to be prepared in accordance 
with German GAAP. Influenceable costs are determined during a cost audit in a specified 
year (referred to as the base year). In the gas industry the base year for the second regulation 
period (2013-2017) is 2010 (§ 34 (5) ARegV). Table 2 summarizes the different cost types as 
well as the corresponding method for inclusion in the revenue cap.  
Table 2. Cost Types and the Inclusion into Revenue Caps 
Cost type Classification Cost base Inclusion in revenue cap 
Network-related costs 
exogenous to the choice of 
managers (e.g. grid fees, 
certain taxes) 
Non-influenceable 
costs 
Actual costs of the 
specific year 
Full inclusion 
All other network-related 
costs 
Influenceable costs 
Based on costs during 
the base year (here: 
2010) 
Only partial inclusion due to 
general reduction and 
individual inefficiency 
reduction 
Return on regulatory equity  Influenceable costs 
Based on fixed 
interest rate on 
regulatory equity 
(here: average of 
2009 and 2010) 
Only partial inclusion due to 
general reduction and 
individual inefficiency 
reduction 
The table provides the different cost types according to the German incentive-regulation and the respective 
inclusion in the revenue caps. 
3. Hypotheses 
The voluntary adoption of new German GAAP provides a unique setting to contribute 
to the understanding of regulatory consequences of accounting choices. The decision to 
voluntarily adopt new accounting standards depends on the expected costs and benefits. For 
financial years starting in 2009 the German legislature permitted firms to voluntarily adopt 
new German GAAP early (early adopters). In financial years starting in 2010 firms are 
required to follow new German GAAP (non-adopters). Voluntary early adoption is costly for 
several reasons: Companies (i) are faced with information gathering for one additional year 
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 (e.g. detailed disclosure for pension provisions, audit fees and deferred taxes), (ii) have less 
time to educate their accounting staff and (iii) have less experience in the application of the 
new rules and therefore face higher risk due to legal uncertainty.  
As stated in Section 2.2, revenue caps comprise operational expenses as well as a 
return on regulatory equity. The rate (percentage) is fixed and defined by the regulator. 
Because the calculation is based on financial statement data, managers can have incentives to 
increase revenue caps by influencing accounting figures. If a company is able to increase the 
level of regulatory equity through exercising accounting discretion 
(ΔREGEQUITY2010,discretion), the additional return will increase the revenue cap. The 
magnitude of the change depends on the individual efficiency level of the company. If it is 
still efficient after the inclusion of the higher return on regulatory equity compared to the 
industry benchmark, the additional return on regulatory equity is fully incorporated. It 
increases revenues without individual efficiency reduction (IIRt) in the following way:  
)GR
CPI
CPI
*(*iREGEQUITY*ΔR t
t
discretionont,discreti −∆=
−
2010
2
,20105.0  (2) 
The factor 0.5 is included because regulatory equity is calculated as the average of 
year-beginning and year-end 2010. The voluntary adoption of new German GAAP only 
affects year-end 2009 (and therefore year-beginning 2010) because in 2010 adoption of new 
German GAAP is mandatory for all companies. Thus, we make sure that we only capture the 
incremental effect of early adoption. If a company is not able to reach an efficiency level of 
100% in the base year, the additional return on equity is part of the inefficient cost (Cinefficient). 
The individual efficiency reduction (IIRt) will decrease the effect within the regulation period. 
In this case, the revenue change is: 
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New German GAAP influences financial statement data used for the calculation of 
revenue caps in several ways. For example under old German GAAP network-related 
liabilities could contain provisions for future internal costs. New German GAAP prohibits 
such provisions. If such provisions were recognized under old German GAAP, managers have 
the choice either to keep these provisions or to reclassify them directly into equity (article 67 
(3) EGHGB). Therefore, regulated companies could have the possibility to increase their 
regulatory equity in the base year and thus their revenue caps.7 On the other hand, early 
adoption could decrease future prices as well. New German GAAP requires future salary and 
pension increases to be included in the calculation of pension provisions, which was voluntary 
according to old German GAAP. A resulting increase in pension provisions will decrease 
regulatory equity and in turn decrease future prices. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of a possible 
increase in future prices due to the early adoption of new German GAAP. 
In general, firms will make profits if their actual costs are below the revenue cap and 
losses if their costs are above. If firms are able to increase their revenue caps for the 
regulation period 2013 to 2017, this increase will lead to higher per unit prices. Prices are 
calculated as revenue cap divided by (expected) quantities. Because the return on regulatory 
equity is independent from the quantities sold, the increase in revenue will affect the 
profitability of the respective company by the same amount. If sales volume reacts to price 
changes, there will be modifications within the revenue cap formula. 8  Therefore, after 
7 Early adopting firms are not able to expense provisions for maintenance expense in the year of the cost audit. 
These expenses for provisions are not part of the cost to calculate the revenue cap for the second regulation 
period. Thus, there is not counter effect which could decrease future prices. 
8 A regulation account balances the revenues through the years of the regulation period if actual earnings exceed 
or fall below the allowed revenues. Furthermore, enduring demand changes are balanced by an expansion factor. 
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 deducting additional costs of early adoption, the increased revenue caps directly convert to 
increased (pre-tax) profits for the regulation period 2013 to 2017.  
Figure 1. Interplay of new German GAAP and the Incentive-Regulation of Gas Network 
Providers 
 
Ex ante it is unclear whether firms will early adopt new German GAAP since it could 
increase or decrease future regulated prices. Firms will only adopt if the future prices exceed 
the costs of early adoption. We state our first hypothesis in the following form: 
H1. Across industries, firms from the incentive-regulated gas utility industry are more likely 
to adopt new German GAAP early.  
There are reasons for regulated companies not to choose voluntary adoption. It might 
be that not all regulated companies are able to increase (or they even decrease) their 
regulatory equity or the change in revenue caps is only marginal and does not outweigh the 
costs of early adoption. Conditional on that we confirm our first hypothesis, we therefore 
hypothesize:  
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 H2. Within the incentive-regulated industry, the propensity to voluntarily adopt new German 
GAAP increases with the potential to increase regulatory equity. 
4. Sample Selection and Research Design 
4.1 Sample Selection 
We identify voluntary adopters of new German GAAP using a full-text search in the 
Electronic Federal Gazette, where annual reports of German companies have to be published 
online. Since all companies have to disclose if they adopt new German GAAP in 2009 (article 
66 (3) EGHGB), we are able to explicitly identify all early adopters. We restrict the search to 
large and medium-sized entities as defined by German GAAP, since small companies do not 
have to publish profit and loss statements and external auditing is not mandatory. In total we 
found 344 large and medium-sized voluntary adopters of new German GAAP. We exclude 
banks and insurance companies (18) and non-profit organizations (8) because of their 
different capital structure and different reporting incentives respectively. Furthermore, we 
exclude publicly listed firms (58). The rationale for this is that network services are provided 
by legally separated firms (Directive 2003/54/EC, article 15). To rule out that incentives from 
public and private firms interfere, we limit our sample to private firms. After removing firms 
with missing data (28) our sample consists of 232 voluntary adopters. We randomly selected 
the same number of non-adopters to obtain a control sample.9 The data is hand collected from 
the financial statements and from the notes. Table 3 shows that our control sample is fairly 
representative of the overall industry distribution in Germany.10 Furthermore, the table also 
reveals that the industry “Energy Supply”, which contains the incentive-regulated companies, 
9 In total roughly 1.1 million annual reports are listed on the Electronic Federal Gazette on 11,466 pages, each of 
these containing 100 annual reports. We randomly selected these pages and chose the first company which 
fulfilled the criteria of not being small according to German GAAP. 
10 Our sample consists of companies which are classified as being not small according to German Commercial 
Code, which means that they exceed two of the following thresholds in two consecutive years: (1) 4,840,000 
Euro total assets, (2) 9,680,000 Euro sales and (3) 50 employees (§ 267 (1) HGB). The German Federal 
Statistical Office provides data only according to turnover and employees. Therefore, we compare our sample to 
both thresholds. 
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 is over-representative in the treatment sample compared to the control sample and the overall 
industry distribution. 
Table 3. Industry Distribution 
  EARLYt = 0  EARLYt = 1  Industry distribution (rel.)  
Industry  N rel.  N rel.  > 10 m sales >50 empl.  
Agriculture and Forestry  8 0.03  3 0.01  n.a. n.a.  
Mining  0 0.00  0 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Manufactoring  87 0.38  84 0.36  0.31 0.29  
Energy Supply  20 0.09  45 0.19  0.03 0.01  
Water Supply  2 0.01  10 0.04  0.02 0.01  
Building Industry  14 0.06  16 0.07  0.05 0.05  
Trade and Maintenance  49 0.21  28 0.12  0.36 0.14  
Traffic and Storage  11 0.05  7 0.03  0.05 0.05  
Hotel and Restaurant  1 0.00  1 0.00  0.01 0.03  
Information and Comm.  6 0.03  14 0.06  0.04 0.04  
Finance and Insurance  1 0.00  1 0.00  0.01 0.03  
Real Estate  4 0.02  1 0.00  0.03 0.01  
Independent Profession  6 0.03  6 0.03  0.05 0.05  
Other Economic Services  8 0.03  7 0.03  0.03 0.08  
Civil Services and Defense  0 0.00  0 0.00  n.a. n.a.  
Education  1 0.00  0 0.00  0.00 0.03  
Health Care  8 0.03  5 0.02  0.02 0.14  
Art and Entertainment  4 0.02  1 0.00  0.00 0.01  
Other Service  2 0.01  3 0.01  0.01 0.03  
Total  232 1.00  232 1.00  1.00 1.00  
This table reports the industry distribution of our sample partitioned by EARLY and the overall German industry 
distribution by sales and employees. Our sample requires companies to be classified as at least medium sized 
according to the German Commercial Code. This means that they exceed two of the following thresholds in two 
consecutive years: (1) 4,840,000 Euro total assets, (2) 9,680,000 Euro sales and (3) 50 employees (§ 267 (1) 
HGB). The overall German industry distribution (of 2009) is presented for firms which have at least 10 million 
Euro of sales or more than 50 employees respectively and is based on data provided by the German Federal 
Statistical Office. This dataset does not provide data for the industries “Agriculture and Forestry” and “Civil 
Services and Defense”. EARLY is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 
and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, we draw a random control sample of 100 incentive-regulated gas 
companies which did not adopt new German GAAP early. The sample selection is based on a 
list provided by the German Federal Network Agency that contains all incentive-regulated 
German companies (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011a).  
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 4.2 Research Design 
We analyze the determinants of voluntary adoption of new German GAAP by using a 
logistic regression design. The dependent variable EARLYt is coded one if a company is an 
early adopter and zero otherwise. The models are designed as follows: 
{ } )**(logit1prob 10 ControlsGASEARLY itt βββ ++==  (4) 
Incentive-regulation: To test our hypotheses we generate a dummy variable GASt 
which is coded one (zero) if the company is (not) within the incentive-regulated gas utility 
industry. We are able to identify firms which are incentive-regulated based on the list 
provided by the German Federal Network Agency. Besides the variable of main interest, we 
include variables for other incentives influencing the probability of early adopting new 
German GAAP.  
Ownership structure: We assume that companies with a more dispersed ownership 
structure could have an incentive to voluntary adopt new German GAAP early. More market 
based accounting principles and increased disclosure can potentially be used to reduce 
information asymmetries between managers and non-controlling owners. Whereas controlling 
investors can gain insights into the economic situation of the firm using private information 
channels, non-controlling investors are to some extent more dependent on accounting 
information (Beatty and Harris, 1998). Ownership information is gathered from the 
Hoppenstedt database. We include CLOSEHt as a dummy variable that is coded one if the 
company has one investor with voting power over 50%.11 
Taxation: The changes of new German GAAP do not affect the tax base since tax 
specific regulations offset these changes. Nevertheless, book-tax conformity was abandoned 
and tax induced incentives to early adopt might indirectly arise because of tax-related 
11 Hoppenstedt database provides ownership data of 459 companies of our overall sample of 564 companies. We 
analyze private firms and assume that most private firms are held by one controlling investor. Where ownership 
data is available 86.3% of the companies have a controlling investor. Thus, we code CLOSEHt one for 
companies that are not available in Hoppenstedt. 
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 incentives before adoption. Thus, firms with strong tax-related incentives before adoption of 
new German GAAP might benefit more from early adoption because discretion can now be 
exercised with less influence on taxes. We include the local tax factor 
(Gewerbesteuerhebesatz) as a proxy for tax incentives (TAXRATEt-1). The local tax factor 
varies by the municipality where the company is located. We assign the respective local tax 
rate of the year before there was the option to adopt new German GAAP early. The data is 
provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009).  
Debt contracting: Capital structure is an important element in debt covenants and 
within a bank’s internal rating process (e.g. Beneish and Press, 1993). Managers may have an 
incentive to improve their capital structure by adopting new German GAAP. New German 
GAAP provides managers with various instruments to increase equity. Banks with rational 
expectations should anticipate such behavior in a way that they exclude accounting changes 
from the calculation of debt covenants (Mohrman, 1996). In contrast to this assumption, 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that only some banks in fact exclude accounting method 
changes from the calculation of debt covenants. EQUITYt-1 is book value of equity deflated by 
total assets. As there might be other capital structure-related and debt financing-related 
incentives to adopt new German GAAP early, we include the dummy variable BANKDEBTt, 
which is a dummy variable coded one if the company has liabilities to banks and zero 
otherwise 
Affiliation: There might also be substantial differences in the incentive structure of 
stand-alone companies and companies belonging to a group. Incentives to adopt new German 
GAAP at group level might interfere with those of the subsidiary. Therefore, we include the 
dummy variable GROUPt in our analyses which is coded one (zero) if the company is (not) a 
member of a group.  
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 Profitability: ROAt-1 is included to control for profitability, which is return on assets 
measured as EBIT divided by total assets at year-beginning. On the one hand, more profitable 
companies could use the adoption of new German GAAP to signal their good type (higher 
profitability). On the other hand, less profitable firms might be more likely to adopt new 
German GAAP to increase their equity ratio (e.g. by derecognition of specific provisions) and 
to increase net income (e.g. through new rules on currency translation).  
Size effects: The implementation of new German GAAP should be relatively less 
costly for bigger firms compared to smaller firms. Providing disclosure incurs fixed costs and 
bigger firms are more likely to have prepared the data already for internal evaluation purposes 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). Furthermore, bigger firms 
require specialized accounting departments and thus it is more likely that they can respond 
faster to changes in accounting rules (Murphy, 1999). We measure SIZEt-1 as the natural 
logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euro) at year-end. 
Auditor: Prior literature documents that auditors play a significant role regarding the 
choice of accounting policies of firms (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971). It is reasonable to 
expect that big audit firms are able to adapt faster to rule changes due to their large policy 
departments. Thus, the voluntary adoption of a new accounting regime could be driven by big 
auditing firms. BIG5t is a dummy variable coded one if a company is audited by one of the 
five dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PWC).  
Earnings management potential: Especially derecognition of specific provisions (e.g. 
provisions for future maintenance expense) can increase book equity upon first time adoption 
of new German GAAP. We include PROVISIONSt-1 to control for earnings management 
potential. 
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 5. Empirical Findings 
5.1 Determinants of Voluntary Adoption of new German GAAP across Industries 
To examine whether regulated gas companies are more likely to adopt new German 
GAAP early, we investigate the incentives for early adoption across industries. Table 4 
reports summary statistics of two subsamples divided by EARLYt. In total, the sample consists 
of 464 companies, half of them are early adopters and half are randomly selected non-
adopters. The number of incentive-regulated gas companies is roughly three times larger 
within the early adopters (15.5%) compared to the non-adopters (5.6%). This gives first 
indications that firms from the gas utility industry are more likely than other firms to 
voluntarily adopt new German GAAP early. On average the change in equity of the voluntary 
adopters is only slightly larger than that of the non-adopters.  
Table 5 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations. GASt is significantly positively 
correlated with EARLYt and with both the change in equity and the size of a company. 
Furthermore, EARLYt is significant negatively correlated with the equity ratios of 2008 and 
2009 and CLOSEHt, and positively correlated with BIG5t, PROVISIONSt-1 and TAXRATEt-1. 
Table 6 presents the results of our multivariate analysis. The models use robust 
standard errors and industry fixed effects when indicated. We find a significant influence of 
GASt (two-sided p-value below 1%) on the probability to adopt new German GAAP early. 
Besides our main variable of interest we control for other incentives to voluntarily adopt new 
German GAAP in Model 2 and Model 3. EQUITYt-1 and CLOSEHt are negatively significant 
at the 5% level. Furthermore, TAXRATEt-1 is significant at the 5% level. Overall, our models 
support Hypothesis 1: Incentive-regulated gas companies are more likely to adopt new 
German GAAP early than firms from the control sample. 
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 Table 4. Summary Statistics 
EARLYt = 0  N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
EQUITYt-1  232 0.317    0.22 -0.13 0.16 0.28    0.45 0.87 
EQUITYt  232 0.342    0.24 -0.09 0.17 0.30    0.50 1.00 
ΔEQUITYt  232 0.025    0.08 -0.28 0.00 0.01    0.04 0.54 
ROAt-1  232 0.102    0.12 -0.24 0.03 0.07    0.15 0.54 
SIZEt-1  232 10.070    1.31 7.78 9.04 9.89    10.89 14.01 
TOTASSt-1  232 69.342    164.37 2.39 8.44 19.73    53.63 1,208.88 
SALESt-1  232 67.911    164.09 0.22 7.20 18.99    55.16 1,221.82 
TAXRATEt-1  232 3.855    0.56 2.10 3.40 3.80    4.40 4.90 
PROVISIONSt-1  232 0.141    0.13 0.00 0.05 0.10    0.20 0.75 
BIG5t  232 0.254          
BANKDEBTt  232 0.698          
CLOSEHt  232 0.910          
GASt  232 0.056          
GROUPt  232 0.470          
EARLYt = 1  N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
EQUITYt-1  232 0.259*** 0.21 -0.13 0.11 0.22*** 0.38 0.87 
EQUITYt  232 0.293** 0.23 -0.09 0.11 0.25** 0.43 1.00 
ΔEQUITYt  232 0.034 0.09 -0.31 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.50 
ROAt-1  232 0.090 0.14 -0.24 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.61 
SIZEt-1  232 10.239 1.38 7.78 9.20 10.04 11.16 14.01 
TOTASSt-1  232 83.465** 177.98 2.39 9.87 22.89** 70.15 1,208.88 
SALESt-1  232 92.146 200.58 0.22 10.56 21.40 71.94 1,221.82 
TAXRATEt-1  232 3.968 0.55 2.40 3.50 4.03** 4.46 4.90 
PROVISIONSt-1  232 0.182*** 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.14*** 0.26 0.75 
BIG5t  232 0.341**       
BANKDEBTt  232 0.711       
CLOSEHt  232 0.853*       
GASt  232 0.155**       
GROUPt  232 0.526       
The table reports the summary statistics of the full sample partitioned by EARLY. EARLY is coded one if the 
company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero otherwise. EQUITY is book equity divided 
by total assets both at year-end. ΔEQUITY is the change of book equity deflated by total assets at year-end. ROA 
is return on assets (EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets (in thousand Euro) at year-end. TOTASS is total assets at fiscal year-end in million Euro. SALES is 
sales in million Euro. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied by the municipality where the respective company is 
located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of provisions divided by total assets at year-end. BIG5 is a dummy 
variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a dummy variable coded one if the company 
has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a dummy variable coded one if the company has one 
investor with voting power over 50% and zero otherwise. GAS is a dummy variable coded one if the company is 
in the incentive-regulated gas utility industry and zero otherwise. GROUP is a dummy variable coded one if the 
company is consolidated and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from financial years starting after 
January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years starting after 
January 1, 2008. All data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% 
level based on the two tailed t-test of the mean, the chi2 test of the mean of the dichotomous variables and the 
Wilcoxon rank test of the median. 
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 Table 5. Pearson and Spearman Correlations of the Full Sample 
     EQUITYt-1 ΔEQUITYt SIZEt-1 PROVISIONSt-1 BANKDEBTt GASt  
Variable  EARLYt EQUITYt ROAt-1 TAXRATEt-1 BIG5t CLOSEHt GROUPt 
EARLYt   -0.14*** -0.10** 0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.10** 0.14*** 0.09** 0.01 -0.09* 0.16*** 0.06 
EQUITYt-1  -0.14***  0.93*** 0.08* 0.20*** 0.10** -0.04 -0.14*** -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.05 
EQUITYt  -0.11** 0.94***  0.44*** 0.19*** 0.08* -0.03 -0.13*** -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 
ΔEQUITYt  0.05 0.08* 0.36***  0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.10** -0.08* 
ROAt-1  -0.05 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.07  -0.16*** -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.11** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.08* 
SIZEt-1  0.06 0.12*** 0.11** -0.04 -0.18***  0.11** -0.02 0.27*** 0.12** 0.10** 0.26*** 0.37*** 
TAXRATEt-1  0.10** -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.08  0.13*** 0.11** -0.21*** 0.06 0.08* 0.18*** 
PROVISIONSt-1  0.14*** -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.16*** -0.03 0.09**  0.13*** -0.28*** -0.02 0.12** 0.07 
BIG5t  0.09** -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08* 0.27*** 0.12** 0.07  -0.22*** 0.09** 0.10** 0.40*** 
BANKDEBTt  0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.11** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.22***  -0.09** -0.04 -0.19*** 
CLOSEHt  -0.09* 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.09** 0.06 -0.07 0.09** -0.09**  0.02 0.37*** 
GASt  0.16*** -0.03 0.02 0.11** -0.09* 0.24*** 0.07 0.12** 0.10** -0.04 0.02  0.09** 
GROUPt  0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.11** -0.11** 0.37*** 0.19*** 0.04 0.40*** -0.19*** 0.37*** 0.09**  
The table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. In total the sample consists of 464 companies. EARLY is coded one 
if the company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero otherwise. EQUITY is book equity divided by total assets both at year-end. ΔEQUITY is the change 
of book equity deflated by total assets at year-end. ROA is return on assets (EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets (in thousand Euro) at year-end. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied by the municipality where the respective company is located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of 
provisions divided by total assets at year-end. BIG5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a dummy variable coded one if the company has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company has one investor with voting power over 50% and zero otherwise. GAS is a dummy variable coded one if the company is in the 
incentive-regulated gas utility industry and zero otherwise. GROUP is a dummy variable coded one if the company is consolidated and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks 
values from financial years starting after January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 2008. All 
data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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 Table 6. Logistic Model of Early Adoption of new German GAAP 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
GASt 1.130*** 15.083*** 13.593*** 
 (0.339) (0.778) (0.920) 
SAMEINDUSTRYt   1.060* 
   (0.607) 
EQUITYt-1   -1.306** 
   (0.551) 
GROUPt   0.195 
   (0.252) 
BANKDEBTt   0.457* 
   (0.271) 
CLOSEHt   -0.661** 
   (0.315) 
ROAt-1   -0.404 
   (0.912) 
SIZEt-1   0.003 
   (0.095) 
TAXRATEt-1   0.447** 
   (0.204) 
PROVISIONSt-1   1.163 
   (0.841) 
BIG5t   0.282 
    (0.259) 
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes 
LR chi2 11.13 418.32 273.54 
Prob>chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
N 464 463 463 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of the voluntary adoption of new German GAAP in 
2009. The sample consists of 232 voluntary adopters and 232 randomly chosen non-adopters. The dependent 
variable EARLY is coded one if the company voluntary adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero 
otherwise. GAS is a dummy variable coded one if the company is in the incentive-regulated gas utility industry 
and zero otherwise. SAMEINDUSTRY is coded one (zero) if the respective company is (not) within the 
industry “Energy supply” but not incentive-regulated. EQUITY is book equity divided by total assets 2008. 
GROUP is a dummy variable coded one if the company is consolidated and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a dummy 
variable coded one if the company has one investor with voting power over 50% and zero otherwise. ROA is 
return on assets (EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets (in thousand Euro) at year-end. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied by the municipality where the 
respective company is located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of provisions divided by total assets at year-
end. BIG5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in 
Germany (BDO, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values 
from financial years starting after January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values 
from financial years starting after January 1, 2008. Robust standard errors are provided within the brackets 
below the coefficients. All data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level. 
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 To further control for the influence of a parent company, we verify whether regulated 
gas companies have the same ultimate owner. This could be potentially problematic as it 
might be that a single parent owns different subsidiaries and requires them to early adopt new 
German GAAP for reasons other than price regulation. We observe that the regulated gas 
companies have different ultimate owners. Therefore, we conclude that our results are not 
driven by ownership concentration.  
To rule out that there are other industry-specific incentives besides the incentive-
regulation we include a dummy variable which is coded one if the company is within the 
same industry but not incentive-regulated (SAMEINDUSTRYt). These companies are gas or 
electricity providers but do not own distribution networks. We find that they have a slightly 
higher likelihood of early adopting new German GAAP compared to other firms. 
Nevertheless, there are only a few firms in the same industry and results have to be 
interpreted with caution.  
It might be that the incentive-regulation itself requires companies to adopt new 
German GAAP early. We can address this concern in two different ways. First, we observe 
that the majority of regulated gas companies did not adopt early. Thus, we are confident that 
early adoption was not forced by the regulator. Second, if our results are driven by industry-
effects then there should be no systematic differences within the industry with respect to the 
adoption decision. Energy network providers can be divided into gas network providers 
(GNP) and electricity network providers (ENP). Both groups belong to the same industry and 
face the same regulation except that the cost audit of GNP coincides with the early adoption 
period of new German GAAP whereas at ENP the cost audit is one year later. This means that 
only GNP can use early adoption of new German GAAP to increase revenue caps. Thus, ENP 
can serve as a natural control group as they only differ in respect that they cannot increase 
revenue caps by early adoption. In contrast to GNP, we do not observe any voluntary adopter 
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 within the ENP group. We do not estimate a logit model on a sample of GNP and ENP firms 
since this will lead to a quasi-complete separation of data points due to the fact that there are 
no early adopters within the ENP group. When we run a Fisher exact test (Table 7) based on 
the resulting contingency test we find that the difference between GNP and ENP with respect 
to early adoption is highly significant (p-Value below 0.001).12 Taken together, the fact that 
not a single ENP (out of 373 firms) adopted GAAP early provides strong evidence that the 
choice of GNP to adopt new German GAAP early is driven by regulatory effects and not by 
industry affiliation.13 
Table 7. Contingency Table of Incentive-Regulated Firms (GNP & ENP) 
 GAS = 0 GAS = 1 Total 
EARLYt = 0 373 687 1,060 
EARLYt = 1 0 36 36 
Total 373 723 1,096 
The table provides the number of gas and electricity network providers that adopted new German GAAP early 
and those that did not. EARLY is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and 
zero otherwise. GAS is a dummy variable coded one if the company is in the incentive-regulated gas utility 
industry and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 2009. 
5.2 Consequences of Voluntary Adoption of new German GAAP 
To support our first hypothesis, we investigate whether voluntary adopters from the 
gas utility industry indeed benefit from early adoption of new German GAAP by increasing 
their regulatory equity. Panel A of Table 8 presents the total equity changes from 2008 to 
2009. While the equity ratio of all early adopters increases on average by 3.4 percentage 
points, the equity ratio of regulated firms increases by 7.2 percentage points. Panel B of Table 
12 The number of firms in Table 7 differs from those in Table 1 because firms often have both a gas and a 
electricity distribution network. 
13 Nevertheless, it still might be that sample differences affect our results. Following this argument, our results 
would be impaired if we face a model that is mis-specified or if we have omitted variables in our model. A 
matching design might be appropriate to obtain control firms with similar characteristics. This matching could be 
done based on the determinants from the determinants model mentioned above (Table 6). The best match 
possible we can think of is a sample of firms which are similar not only by firm characteristics (e.g size, ROA, 
leverage, ownership structure) but also with the same business model and regulatory oversight (e.g. ENP). 
Theoretically, this test would be doable since (i) we know all voluntary adopters of new German GAAP and (ii) 
we are able to distinguish between GNP and ENP. Thus, we could match our sample of GNP with ENP with the 
same firm characteristics based on the determinants model. But again, similar to above, since there are no early 
adopters within the ENP, the treatment sample would consist solely of GNP and the control sample would solely 
consist of non-adopting ENP. Thus, a test would be self-evident and would confirm our results that GNP are 
more likely to adopt new German GAAP early. 
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 8 shows the changes in equity that are attributable to adoption of new German GAAP. We 
observe an average increase of 2.0 percentage points for all early adopters and a 4.5 
percentage points for regulated firms, respectively. 
Table 8. Equity Changes 
Panel A: Changes in Book Equity 
EARLYt Sample N EQUITYt-1 EQUITYt ΔEQUITYt 
1 GASt = 1 36 0.262  (0.256) 0.334  (0.352) 0.072**   (0.097)** 
1 GASt = 0 196 0.258  (0.211) 0.285  (0.231) 0.027       (0.020) 
1 Total 232 0.259  (0.224) 0.293  (0.254) 0.034       (0.031) 
0 GASt = 1 15 0.270  (0.279) 0.289  (0.246) 0.019       (-0.033) 
0 GASt = 0 217 0.321  (0.279) 0.346  (0.297) 0.025       (0.019) 
0 Total 232 0.317  (0.279) 0.342  (0.297) 0.025       (0.018) 
 
Panel B: Changes in Book Equity due to Adoption of new German GAAP  
Sample N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Total 232 0.020*** 0.057 -0.279 -0.001 0.000*** 0.025 0.383 
GASt = 1 36 0.045*** 0.063 -0.011 0.004 0.017*** 0.061 0.213 
 
Panel C: Changes in Regulative Equity due to Adoption of new German GAAP 
Sample N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
GASt = 1 36 0.053*** 0.065 -0.004 0.008 0.031*** 0.071 0.215 
Panel A provides means (medians) of book equity levels and book equity changes of the sample of early 
adopters of BilMoG. Panel B shows the changes in equity due to the adoption of BilMoG. Panel C provides 
regulatory equity changes attributable to BilMoG adoption. EQUITY is book equity divided by total assets 2008. 
ΔEQUITY is the change book of equity deflated by total assets 2008. GAS is a dummy variable coded one if the 
company is in the incentive-regulated gas utility industry and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from 
financial years starting after January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from 
financial years starting after January 1, 2008. The respective medians are provided in brackets. All data is 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level (difference of means and 
medians by EARLY in Panel A). 
As the calculation of revenue caps is based on regulatory equity which differs from 
book value of equity, we analyze changes in regulatory equity. We cannot observe the total 
amount of regulatory equity because it is not disclosed. However, we are able to estimate 
changes in regulatory equity due to the adoption of new German GAAP. As stated in section 
2.2, regulatory equity is computed as the two-year-average value of network-related PPE 
minus network-related liabilities. Disclosures in the notes regarding the first time adoption of 
new German GAAP allow us to estimate the change in regulatory equity 
(ΔREGEQUITYt,Early) in the following way:  
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(5) 
Panel C of Table 8 presents the results of the change in regulatory equity caused by 
early adoption. We find that incentive-regulated firms increase regulatory equity on average 
by 5.3 percentage points. This supports our first hypothesis by showing that voluntary 
adoption of new German GAAP can be used to increase regulatory equity and thus revenue 
caps. 
Based on the formulas (2) and (3) introduced in Section 2.2 we are able to calculate 
the effect of increased regulatory equity on revenue caps. The magnitude of the effects is 
dependent on the firms’ efficiency levels. As we are not able to observe this level, we employ 
two scenarios. First, we assume that companies are not completely efficient. Therefore, we 
use Formula (3) to calculate the change in revenue caps at the interest rate of 7.14% 
(investments before January 1st 2006). Second, we assume that companies are efficient and 
use Formula (2) and the interest rate of 9.05% (investments after January 1st 2006). Therefore, 
we are able to calculate a bandwidth where the real change is somewhere in between. 
We use the average inflation rate of Germany over the last ten years of 1.6% 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2012) to calculate the changes in the consumer price index. The 
individual inefficiency reductions (IIRt) of the years 2012 to 2017 range from 0 in year 2012 
to 0.8 in year 2017 in steps of 0.2. The general reduction (GRt) for the second regulation 
period is 1.5% per annum. We discount the change in revenue of the years 2013-2017 with 
the current inflation rate of Germany. The cumulated effect deflated by different variables is 
presented in Table 9.  
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 Table 9. Regulatory Consequences of Adoption of new German GAAP 
Panel A: Average Change in Revenue for Inefficient Companies 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
ΔR in thousand Euro (inefficient) 275.17 220.36 165.45 110.42 55.27 
ΔR in thousand Euro (efficient) 348.78 349.14 349.51 349.89 350.29 
 
Panel B: Discounted Change in Revenue (EFFECT) for Inefficient Companies 
 N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
EFFECT in thousand Euro 36 775 1,741 -48 39 151 508 8,092 
EFFECT / EQUITYt-1 36 0.165 0.387 -0.006 0.002 0.009 0.055 1.644 
EFFECT / SALESt -1 36 0.007 0.016 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.092 
 
Panel C: Discounted Change in Revenue (EFFECT) for Efficient Companies 
 N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
EFFECT in thousand Euro 36 1,623 3,646 -101 83 315 1,064 16,938 
EFFECT / EQUITYt-1 36 0.346 0.810 -0.013 0.005 0.020 0.116 3.441 
EFFECT / SALESt -1 36 0.014 0.034 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.015 0.193 
The table provides the estimated consequences of the voluntary adoption of BilMoG of incentive-regulated 
companies from the gas utility industry. ΔR is the change in the revenue cap due to the adoption of BilMoG. 
EFFECT is the cumulative increase of revenue caps from 2013 to 2017 due to the adoption of new German 
GAAP discounted to Dec. 31, 2009. EQUITY and SALES are the respective items from the balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement, respectively. The subscript t marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 
2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 
2008. 
The average revenue cap increase in the first year of the second regulation period is  
between € 275k and € 348k. Besides the costs of early adoption, the increase in revenues 
increases profits with the same amount (see section 2). The magnitude of this effect is 
dependent on the efficiency-level of the firm compared to a benchmark. If a company is not 
fully efficient, the amount decreases on a year by year basis between 2013 and 2017. In 
contrast, for an efficient network provider the amount stays constant. The bandwidth of the 
sum of discounted increase in revenues is on average between € 775k and € 1,623k for the 5-
year regulation period. Neglecting the costs of early adoption, the profit scaled by equity of 
2008 is between 16.5% and 34.6%; scaled by revenues it is 0.7% and 1.4%, respectively. 
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 5.3 Determinants of Voluntary Adoption of new German GAAP within the Incentive-
Regulated Gas Utility Industry 
To gain a deeper understanding why not all incentive-regulated gas companies adopt 
BilMoG early, we compare our sample of incentive-regulated early adopters with a random 
control sample of 100 incentive-regulated non-adopters. In order to benefit from the adoption 
of new German GAAP, regulated firms need to be able to increase regulatory equity. We 
assume that the ability to increase regulatory equity is the main determinant to early adopt 
new German GAAP for regulated firms. As accounts only have to be translated in the year of 
adoption, the ability to increase regulatory equity is only observable for late adopters in 2010. 
We deem the change in regulatory equity (ΔREGEQUITYt+1) in the year of the mandatory 
adoption (2010) as a suitable proxy for potential changes in 2009 as the items affecting 
regulatory equity stay relatively constant over time. Unreported results show that the mean of 
total provisions, pension provisions and other provisions is not changing significantly. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 10. Comparing both samples, early adopters 
are more often part of a group (61.1% compared to 37.0%) and the change in book equity is 
more pronounced (7.2% compared to 1.2%). As stated in section 5.2, early adopters increase 
their regulatory equity on average by 5.3 percentage points. One year later, mandatory 
adopters increase their regulatory equity on average by just 0.6%. Mostly the change is almost 
zero or even negative. 
Table 11 presents the correlation matrix of the incentive-regulated sample. EARLYt is 
positively correlated to both the changes in equity and in regulatory equity. Furthermore, 
EARLYt is negatively related to EQUITYt-1 and BANKDEBTt.  
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 Table 10. Summary Statistics of the Incentive-Regulated Sample 
EARLYt = 0  N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
EQUITYt-1  100 0.321    0.18 0.00 0.21 0.33    0.45 0.80 
EQUITYt  100 0.334    0.18 0.00 0.23 0.33    0.46 0.83 
ΔEQUITYt  100 0.012    0.03 -0.17 0.00 0.01    0.02 0.19 
ΔREGEQUITYt+1  100 0.006    0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00    0.00 0.15 
ROAt-1  100 0.047    0.11 -0.53 0.03 0.06    0.09 0.22 
SIZEt-1  100 10.754    1.27 7.20 10.07 10.65    11.45 14.20 
TAXRATEt-1  100 3.850    0.45 2.90 3.50 3.90    4.25 4.70 
PROVISIONSt-1  100 0.154    0.15 0.01 0.05 0.10    0.19 0.85 
BIG5t  100 0.360          
BANKDEBTt  100 0.780          
CLOSEHt  100 0.960          
GROUPt  100 0.370          
EARLYt = 1  N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
EQUITYt-1  36 0.262* 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.26* 0.39 0.80 
EQUITYt  36 0.334 0.21 0.00 0.19 0.35 0.46 0.83 
ΔEQUITYt  36 0.072*** 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.04*** 0.11 0.29 
ΔREGEQUITYt  36 0.053*** 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.07 0.20 
ROAt-1  36 0.041 0.13 -0.47 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.22 
SIZEt-1  36 11.089 1.37 8.77 10.18 11.10 12.04 14.09 
TAXRATEt-1  36 4.077** 0.46 3.10 3.85 4.03** 4.50 4.90 
PROVISIONSt-1  36 0.230** 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.19*** 0.28 0.86 
BIG5t  36 0.444       
BANKDEBTt  36 0.583**       
CLOSEHt  36 0.889       
GROUPt  36 0.611**             
The table reports the summary statistics of the incentive-regulated sample partitioned by EARLY. EARLY is 
coded one if the company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero otherwise. EQUITY is book 
equity divided by total assets both at year-end. ΔEQUITY is the change of book equity deflated by total assets at 
year-end. ΔREGEQUITY is the change of regulatory equity deflated by total assets at year-end. ROA is return on 
assets (EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets 
(in thousand Euro) at year-end. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied by the municipality where the respective 
company is located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of provisions divided by total assets at year-end. BIG5 is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a dummy variable coded one if the 
company has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a dummy variable coded one if the company 
has one investor with voting power over 50% and zero otherwise. GROUP is a dummy variable coded one if the 
company is consolidated and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from financial years starting after 
January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years starting after 
January 1, 2008. The subscript t+1 marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 2010. All data is 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level based on the two tailed t-
test of the mean, the chi2 test of the mean of the dichotomous variables and the Wilcoxon rank test of the 
median. 
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 Table 11. Pearson and Spearman Correlations of the Incentive-Regulated Sample 
     EQUITYt-1 ΔEQUITYt ROAt-1 TAXRATEt-1 BIG5t CLOSEHt 
Variable  EARLYt EQUITYt ΔREGEQUITYt/t+1 SIZEt-1 PROVISIONSt-1 BANKDEBTt GROUPt 
EARLYt    -0.14* 0.00 0.46*** 0.46*** -0.03 0.11 0.22** 0.21** 0.08 -0.20** -0.13 0.21** 
EQUITYt-1  -0.16*  0.95*** -0.12 -0.13 0.47*** 0.12 -0.22*** -0.50*** -0.25*** 0.33*** 0.03 -0.14 
EQUITYt  0.00 0.94***  0.19** 0.06 0.49*** 0.10 -0.23*** -0.46*** -0.27*** 0.29*** -0.01 -0.16* 
ΔEQUITYt  0.36*** 0.02 0.25***  0.61*** 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14* -0.07 
ΔREGEQUITYt/t+1  0.50*** -0.06 0.06 0.36***  0.08 0.05 0.03 0.28*** 0.04 -0.17* -0.10 -0.03 
ROAt-1  0.04 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.14 0.21**  0.21** -0.09 -0.43*** -0.20** 0.39*** -0.09 -0.18** 
SIZEt-1  0.13 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.04  0.30*** 0.00 0.19** 0.22*** -0.04 0.18** 
TAXRATEt-1  0.21** -0.24*** -0.24*** 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.31***  0.28*** 0.19** -0.19** 0.05 0.23*** 
PROVISIONSt-1  0.27*** -0.46*** -0.39*** 0.17** 0.26*** -0.05 0.07 0.26***  0.27*** -0.39*** 0.04 0.13 
BIG5t  0.08 -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.11 0.06 -0.16* 0.19** 0.18** 0.22***  -0.17* 0.00 0.26*** 
BANKDEBTt  -0.20** 0.31*** 0.26*** -0.04 -0.15* 0.29*** 0.17** -0.20** -0.34*** -0.17*  -0.08 -0.13 
CLOSEHt  -0.13 0.04 -0.02 -0.16* -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.08  0.22** 
GROUPt  0.21** -0.13 -0.15* -0.07 0.03 -0.22** 0.19** 0.23*** 0.11 0.26*** -0.13 0.22**   
The table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. In total the sample consists of 136 companies. EARLY is coded one 
if the company voluntarily adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero otherwise. EQUITY is book equity divided by total assets both at year-end. ΔEQUITY is the change 
of book equity deflated by total assets at year-end. ΔREGEQUITY is the change of regulatory equity deflated by total assets at year-end. ROA is return on assets 
(EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euro) at year-end. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied 
by the municipality where the respective company is located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of provisions divided by total assets at year-end. BIG5 is a dummy variable 
coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a dummy variable coded one if the company has one investor with voting 
power over 50% and zero otherwise. GROUP is a dummy variable coded one if the company is consolidated and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from financial 
years starting after January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 2008. The subscript t+1 marks 
values from financial years starting after January 1, 2010. All data is winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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To analyze the determinants within the incentive-regulated gas utility industry we use 
a logistic regression design similar to Table 6. The results of Table 12 reveal that the change 
in regulatory equity is significantly influencing the probability to early adopt, indicating that 
only firms which are able to increase regulatory equity early adopt BilMoG. In line with our 
second hypothesis, our results suggest that non-adopters have less discretion to increase 
regulatory equity and the benefits of higher revenue caps do not outperform the costs of early 
adoption. For some firms we estimate the change in regulatory equity upon adoption to be 
even negative, resulting from increased pension provisions. 
5.4 Total Regulatory Effect of new German GAAP 
In the previous section, we estimate cash flow consequences of the early adopters of 
the gas utility industry. However, this is just the effect of the early adoption, not the effect of 
the adoption of new German GAAP per se. As stated above, regulatory equity is calculated as 
average of the 2009 and the 2010 amounts. Since in 2010 all companies have to comply with 
new German GAAP, early adoption only affects 2009. Consequently, we included the factor 
“0.5” to calculate the incremental effect of early adoption. Thus, the total effect of new 
German GAAP for early adopters is roughly twice the magnitude. Mandatory adoption in 
2010 could also increase regulatory equity for mandatory adopters. Therefore, the overall 
effect of new German GAAP on regulated prices is that of early adopters and of mandatory 
adopters.  
Based on the voluntary adopters and 100 late adopters from section 5.3 (see Table 7), 
we are able to estimate the overall effect of new German GAAP on gas prices for the 
regulation period from 2013 until 2017. In total, there are more than 700 firms in the gas 
utility industry which had to adopt new German GAAP in 2010. We estimate the increase in 
revenues of the second regulation period to be between 260 and 540 million Euro, depending 
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 on the individual efficiency of the firms. Converting this number to a per household effect 
(approximately 40 million in Germany), the increase is between 6.44 and 13.60 Euro. 
Table 12. Logistic Model of Voluntary Adoption of new German GAAP of the Incentive-
Regulated Sample 
Variable      Model 1   Model 2 
ΔREGEQUITYt/t+1   26.156*** 27.803** 
   (9.609) (11.351) 
EQUITYt-1    0.319 
    (1.547) 
GROUPt    1.490*** 
    (0.543) 
BANKDEBTt    -0.745 
    (0.649) 
CLOSEHt    -2.254** 
    (0.869) 
ROAt-1    0.093 
    (2.148) 
SIZEt-1  
  0.070 
    (0.211) 
TAXRATEt-1  
  0.815 
  
  (0.541) 
PROVISIONSt-1    0.249 
    (1.645) 
BIG5t  
  -0.183 
    (0.535) 
LR chi2         7.41     20.10 
Prob>chi2   0.006     0.028 N          136        136 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of the voluntary adoption of new German GAAP in 
2009. In total the sample consists of 136 companies. The dependent variable EARLY is coded one if the company 
voluntary adopted new German GAAP in 2009 and zero otherwise. ΔREGEQUITY is the change of regulatory 
equity deflated by total assets at year-end. EQUITY is book equity divided by total assets 2008. GROUP is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company is consolidated and zero otherwise. BANKDEBT is a dummy variable 
coded one if the company has liabilities to banks and zero otherwise. CLOSEH is a dummy variable coded one if 
the company has one investor with voting power over 50% and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets 
(EBIT/average of total assets at year-beginning and year-end). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (in 
thousand Euro) at year-end. TAXRATE is the tax factor applied by the municipality where the respective 
company is located. PROVISIONS is the total amount of provisions divided by total assets at year-end. BIG5 is a 
dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in Germany (BDO, 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PWC) and zero otherwise. The subscript t marks values from financial years 
starting after January 1, 2009 (voluntary adoption period). The subscript t-1 marks values from financial years 
starting after January 1, 2008. The subscript t+1 marks values from financial years starting after January 1, 2010. 
Robust standard errors are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. All data is winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
This does not include 373 firms which solely have an electricity distribution network. 
For them the base year is 2011 and the mandatory adoption of new German GAAP is 
influencing year-beginning values of 2011, and thus average values of 2011 by one half. 
These firms are very similar to the gas distribution networks. It is likely that these firms use 
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 accounting discretion upon mandatory adoption to increase regulatory equity as well. Overall, 
the effect of both utility industries is likely to be bigger. 
6. Conclusion 
We provide new evidence of the economic consequences of the adoption of a new 
accounting regime in regulated industries. We are able to estimate increases in regulated 
firms’ revenue caps that are attributable to managers’ decision to voluntarily adopt new 
German GAAP early. We find that firms from the incentive-regulated gas utility industry are 
more likely to early adopt new German GAAP. We provide evidence that these companies 
use the early adoption to increase future revenue caps and thus their profit. Despite having 
strong incentives, we observe that not all gas network providers adopt new German GAAP 
early. In order to explain the cross-sectional differences, we test incentives solely within the 
incentive-regulated gas utility industry. Compared to early adopters, we find that late adopters 
hold significantly less or no discretion to increase their revenue caps. We assume that for 
these companies it is not beneficial to adopt new German GAAP early because higher 
revenues do not outperform the costs of early adoption. In some cases, early adoption would 
have decreased profits. Although our sample of early adopters from the utility industry is 
comparably small compared to the whole industry, we argue that the overall economic effect 
of the introduction of new German GAAP is significant as well: More than 1,000 late 
adopters from the German utility industry (gas and electricity) had to adopt new German 
GAAP in 2010. We estimate the overall revenue increase for the gas utility industry to be 
between 260 and 540 million Euro (between 6.44 and 13.60 Euro per household). 
Our main contribution to the existing literature is that we show the consequences of 
the interplay between regulated prices and a new accounting regime in the European utility 
industries. The respective EU regulation is effective in all 28 member states. Knowing these 
dependencies is crucial for any discussion about a further harmonization of accounting across 
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 Europe, especially for private firms. Understanding these effects requires not only knowledge 
about local accounting regimes but also knowledge about industry-specific regulations, which 
are implemented across EU member states. Since the relevant legal documents are mostly not 
provided in English, we encourage domestic researchers to study the interplay between 
regulations of specific industries (e.g. gas, electricity, water, pipeline, and communication) 
and local GAAP in the context of a potential shift towards IFRS for SMEs.  
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 Appendix A. Overview of Major Changes in German GAAP 
Table A1. Overview of Major Changes in German GAAP 
Old German GAAP New German GAAP (BilMoG) 
Book 
equity 
Internally generated intangible assets  
Prohibition to capitalize research and 
development costs (§ 248 (2) HGB-Old). 
Option to capitalize expenses incurred during 
the development phase of intangible assets (§ 
255 (2a) HGB). 
↑ 
Depreciation of fixed and intangible assets  
In certain circumstances use of tax based 
depreciation principles required (§§ 254 and 
273 HGB-Old). 
Depreciation principles determined only by 
economic substance rather than by tax rules (§ 
253 (3) HGB). 
↑/↓ 
Foreign currency translation in individual financial statements  
Asymmetric translation of foreign currency 
balances: Only realization of exchange losses. 
Realization of exchange losses and gains for 
current assets and liabilities. Only realization of 
exchanges losses for non-current assets and 
liabilities (§ 256a HGB). 
↑ 
Provisions  
Optional recognition of provisions for 
obligations that are not against third parties (e.g. 
future maintenance expense) (§ 249 HGB-Old). 
Prohibition of provisions for obligations that are 
not against third parties other than expenses for 
repairs and maintenance during the first three 
months of the next fiscal year and expenses for 
removal of overburden that are expected during 
the whole next fiscal year (§ 249 HGB). 
↑ 
Discounting of provisions only if they contain 
an interest rate component (§ 253 (1) HGB-
Old).  
Discounting of all long term provisions with 
discount rates based on returns of high class 
bonds (§ 253 (2) HGB).  
↑ 
 
Often discounting of pension provisions using 
the discount rate of 6.0% that is applicable in 
tax law (§ 6 (3) EStG). No incorporation of 
future increases in salary and pension payments. 
Discounting of all long term provisions with 
discount rates based on returns of high class 
bonds (§ 253 (2) HGB). Incorporation of future 
increases in salary and pension payments. 
↓ 
 
Separate recognition of plan assets at historical 
cost. 
Fair-value measurement of plan assets and 
offsetting with pension obligations (§ 246 (2) 2 
HGB). 
↑ 
Deferred taxes  
No recognition of deferred tax assets for tax 
loss carry forwards (prevailed opinion). 
Option to recognize deferred tax assets for tax 
loss carry forwards (§ 274 (1) 4 HGB). 
↑ 
The table contains an overview of key changes in German GAAP due to BilMoG. The sign ↑ marks expected 
increases of book equity. The sign ↓ marks expected decreases of book. The sign – marks no expected influence 
on book equity. 
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Abstract: 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
write-offs following CEO turnover. Subsequent to managerial turnover, it is often observed 
that large one-time charges are used to decrease current earnings for the benefit of higher 
future earnings. This earnings management technique, commonly referred to as big bath 
accounting, facilitates the reaching of given future earnings targets. Overconfident managers 
overestimate their abilities and consequently have upwardly biased expectations concerning 
future firm cash flows. Based on this premise, we hypothesize that overconfident CEOs see 
less need to engage in an earnings bath following managerial change in order to boost future 
earnings. Our empirical results strongly confirm this hypothesis showing that earnings baths 
are significantly less frequent among overconfident CEOs. The abstinence from downward 
earnings manipulation by overconfident CEOs thereby constitutes one of the few documented 
examples of a bright side of managerial overconfidence. 
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 1. Introduction 
Overconfidence has a bad reputation and, as it seems, for a good reason. Empirical 
evidence so far shows that decisions made by overconfident CEOs have mostly adverse 
consequences for their firms' stakeholders. Malmendier and Tate (2008), for instance, show 
that overconfident CEOs are more active but less successful in the M&A market. Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) provide evidence that overconfident CEOs engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting.1 However, are there also circumstances when managerial overconfidence can be 
beneficial? Contrary to the general notion, we argue that CEO overconfidence can also have a 
positive flavor by showing that when overconfident executives are hired, they are less likely 
to use write-offs to manipulate earnings. 
Subsequent to CEO turnover, it is often observed that incoming CEOs use large write-
offs and attribute these losses to their predecessors. This behavior is commonly known as 
taking a big bath, highlighting the magnitude of these write-offs. Big bath accounting thereby 
represents a manipulation intended to shift earnings to the future where gains are attributed to 
the new CEO. Overconfident CEOs, however, underestimate the benefits of this behavior 
because they overestimate future earnings in line with their behavioral bias (i.e., they believe 
that they will reach their earnings targets regardless of a potential earnings bath).2 However, 
even though overconfident CEOs place a lower value in engaging in big bath accounting, they 
might still be inclined to do so if it would not be accompanied with any risks or costs. Yet, 
there are large potential costs associated with this type of earnings management. Desai et al. 
(2006), for instance, document serious labor market consequences for managers after earnings 
1 Other papers that document negative consequences of CEO overconfidence include Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) and Adam et al. (2014). Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs decrease investment 
in positive NPV projects when they have to rely on external finance and Adam et al. (2014) document that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to use performance sensitive debt and perform worse after the issuance of 
these debt contracts. 
2 Analysts seem to be unable to consistently predict earnings management and thus cannot use this behavior in 
their forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). 
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 restatements.3 Dechow et al. (1996) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that firms face large 
capital market costs after revelations of earnings manipulation.4 Consequently, managers face 
a trade-off between potential costs and benefits in the decision to engage in earnings 
manipulations. As overconfident managers place a lower value on the benefits of big bath 
accounting, we expect them to be less likely to engage in such activities in the year of the 
turnover. 
We empirically investigate this prediction by examining CEO turnover of large U.S. 
companies.5 Hereby, we use the ExecuComp database to build up managers' executive stock 
option portfolios following Yermack (1995) and Hall and Liebman (1998) in order to identify 
CEOs as either overconfident or rational. The methodology is based on Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). Managers are classified as overconfident if they ever hold an option until maturity 
which is at least 40 percent in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. The rationale 
behind this is that executives are typically poorly diversified and should exercise executive 
options as soon as possible in order to reduce their exposure to firm-specific risk. We merge 
the data on managerial overconfidence with control variables from Compustat and Lexis 
Nexis. 
Our results provide strong support for our empirical prediction. We show that firms 
engage less in big bath accounting after hiring an overconfident CEO. Following Elliott and 
Shaw (1988), we use the magnitude of write-offs in the form of special items to measure big 
3 These consequences include a significantly larger probability of being replaced as well as poorer prospects for 
future employment. 
4 Hribar and Jenkins (2004) found large increases in the cost of capital after earnings restatements. Dechow et al. 
(1996) report a large decline in market value, increased bid-ask spreads, a drop in analysts following, and an 
increase in the dispersion of analysts' forecast after earnings manipulation has been made public. 
5 We focus on big bath accounting around turnover for several reasons. First, empirical evidence indicates that 
big bath accounting is used more frequently around CEO turnover (Johnson et al., 2011). Second, big bath 
accounting is not only used more frequently but it is also more extreme around turnover (Strong and Meyer, 
1987). Third, the turnover setting allows us to control for time invariant unobservable firm characteristics that 
might endogenously determine the use of big bath accounting. Fourth, big bath accounting during turnover 
allows the incoming CEO to blame poor performance on the predecessor, while taking credit for future increases 
in performance. This benefit is not available for big bath accounting outside of a turnover setting. 
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 bath accounting and find that overconfident CEOs use fewer negative special items to 
decrease earnings in the turnover year. 
An alternative explanation could be that there is a self-selection of overconfident 
managers into firms with lower potential for large write offs in the turnover year. We address 
this potential endogeneity concern in several ways. First, we show that the observed 
differences between the two manager types are not driven by the fact that a management 
change is routine or non-routine. Big bath accounting has been shown to be especially 
prevalent in non-routine turnover (Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002). Thus, by controlling for and 
conditioning on the turnover type we rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a 
self-selection of overconfident CEOs into routine turnover. Second, we use a propensity score 
matching (PSM) design in which the first stage models the choice to hire an overconfident 
manager. This mitigates concerns that firm characteristics simultaneously explain the choice 
to hire a CEO of a certain behavioral type and determine the predicted big bath accounting 
pattern. Third, we run a second propensity score matching model based on firms with similar 
potential for large write offs in the turnover year. The matching results rule out that our 
findings are driven by a selection of rational CEOs into firms with overvalued assets and 
consequently higher big bath accounting potential. And fourth, we ensure that our results are 
not driven by overconfident CEOs failing to execute justified large write offs in the turnover 
year. If that was the case, a necessary restructuring would be only delayed, leading to a 
greater likelihood of large write off usage in future periods. Our results indicate that this is not 
the case. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we contribute to the literature by 
revealing a new factor that shapes large write-offs following CEO turnover: Overconfident 
CEOs are less likely to engage in big bath accounting. The existing literature on earnings 
management at CEO turnover documents that incoming managers take a big bath and write 
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 off assets to ascribe negative outcomes to their predecessors (Murphy and Zimmerman, 
1993). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to link this behavior to managerial traits. 
Second, the finding that overconfident CEOs are less likely to manipulate earnings via 
big bath accounting is one of the first examples that managerial overconfidence can be 
beneficial. We are aware of two other empirical papers highlighting positive effects of 
managerial overconfidence: Hirshleifer et al. (2012) demonstrate that overconfident CEOs are 
better innovators, while Campbellet al. (2011) show that moderate overconfidence leads to 
first-best investment decisions. 
Besides us, few studies have analyzed the influence of CEO overconfidence on 
accounting policies.6 Schrand and Zechman (2012) document that overconfidence is related to 
financial misreporting and fraud and Hribar and Yang (2013), Libby and Rennekamp (2012), 
and Hilary and Hsu (2011) show that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in 
management forecasts and that their forecasts are more specific and optimistic. Ahmed and 
Duellmann (2013) find that firms managed by overconfident CEOs use less conservative 
accounting and delay loss recognition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our empirical 
hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the research methodology. In section 4 we interpret our 
results and section 5 presents robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Overconfident managers systematically overestimate their abilities and consequently 
the future cash flows they are able to generate with their firms.7 This implies that they place a 
6 Some papers relate other personal characteristics of CEOs to accounting policies. For example, Francis et al. 
(2008) show that firms with more reputable CEOs have poorer earnings quality. 
7 The terms overconfidence and optimism have been used inconsistently in the literature. We define managerial 
overconfidence to mean that the executive consistently overestimates the firm’s future expected cash flows. 
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 higher value on the company than rational market participants. 8  Ahmed and Duellmann 
(2013) show that the perceived superior ability by overconfident manager induces them to 
choose less conservative (i.e., more aggressive) accounting. 
However, we argue that managerial overconfidence has additional effects on 
accounting choices which do not necessarily result in more aggressive accounting. In 
particular, we are interested in management actions following CEO turnover. Pourciau (1993) 
finds that incoming managers decrease earnings in their first year in order to report higher 
earnings in the following years and ascribe these write-offs to the former manager. This 
behavior is commonly known as "taking a big bath", highlighting the magnitude of these 
write-offs. We argue that overconfident managers are less likely to take a big bath. Taking a 
big bath is beneficial for incoming CEOs as they will be able to report increased earnings in 
the future. The cost of taking a big bath, however, is that the firm (i) has to provide additional 
information about the respective special item, (ii) exhibits increased SEC scrutiny, (iii) has 
less accounting flexibility in future years, (iv) will have excessive negotiation with the auditor 
and (v) faces severe labor market and capital market costs when the earnings manipulation is 
made public.9 Therefore, the incoming CEO faces a trade-off between costs and benefits of 
big bath accounting. Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability relative to other managers 
(e.g., their predecessors) and consequently believe that the company's projects will realize 
higher earnings in the future when these projects are managed by them. Therefore, they are 
certain of reaching their earnings targets (e.g., avoid the zero benchmark, meet and beat 
analysts' or management forecasts, reach bonus payment thresholds, etc.) and thus 
8 The perceived increase in firm value is thereby independent of whether or not the incoming CEOs have already 
exerted effort in managing the firm. Current firm value reflects the discounted stream of expected future cash 
flows. Thus, as overconfident managers have upwardly biased beliefs with respect to future cash flows, the value 
they place on the company immediately exceeds the current market value. 
9 See for example Dechow et al. (1996), Desai et al. (2006) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004). Hereby SEC scrutiny 
is not limited to upward earnings manipulations. Badertscher et al. (2009) for instance report that about 20 
percent of firms with misstated reports that resulted in SEC investigation used income decreasing manipulations. 
In Nelson et al. (2003) the percentage of income decreasing earnings management approaches detected by 
auditors even amounts to 38 percent. 
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 underestimate the necessity of increasing future earnings by large write-offs today. Thus, 
overconfident managers do not believe that the benefits will outweigh the costs and are less 
likely to engage in big bath accounting. 
HYPOTHESIS. Incoming overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big bath accounting 
compared to incoming rational CEOs. 
One potential concern might be that overconfident managers might still have an incentive to 
use big bath accounting as this leads to an even larger increase in future earnings and 
consequently even to an over-achievement of pre-set earnings targets. 10  However, over-
achievement of these targets is typically unfavorable as this might entail an upward revision 
of future requirements such as higher earnings targets or higher bonus payment thresholds 
according to Weitzmann (1980) (ratchet effect). Empirical research is generally consistent 
with this conjecture and shows for instance that firms manage earnings to closely match 
analyst forecasts (Dechow and Skinner, 2000), to report positive earnings (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997) or to meet bonus payment thresholds (Healy, 1985). 
3. Data and Research Methodology 
3.1 Measurement of Overconfidence 
We follow Malmendier and Tate (2005) and construct our overconfidence measure 
based on executive option holdings.11 Executives are classified as overconfident when they 
ever hold an option until maturity which is at least 40 percent in-the-money at the year-end 
prior to maturity.12 Thus, overconfidence is considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal 
10 There is usually an asymmetric reaction concerning the reaching vs. not reaching of future goals such as the 
meeting of analyst targets or the reporting of positive earnings. Thus, there are strong negative consequences of 
not reaching these targets. 
11 We use ExecuComp to obtain information on executive stock option grants, exercised options, and option 
holdings. For details concerning the construction of the option portfolios and the overconfidence classification 
algorithm see the Appendix and Hall and Murphy (2002). 
12 The threshold is derived according to Hall and Murphy (2002) by using a constant relative risk-aversion 
parameter of 3 and 67 percent of wealth in company stock. The original Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
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 characteristic of the executive. 13  Several other studies employ proxies for managerial 
overconfidence that are also related to the moneyness of the managers' stock options but do 
not require that a manager holds options until the last year of maturity. In particular, Schrand 
and Zechman (2012) classify managers as overconfident if the value of their exercisable 
options is higher than the industry median in a given year. We choose the measure used by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) because it does not require to classify 50% of all managers as 
overconfident. Furthermore, it is more directly related to the individual executives as the 
classification is based on trading behavior of personal option portfolios.14 
The rationale for relying on the executive's option exercise behavior as a means of 
classification into rational or overconfident managers is the following: Executives face a 
trade-off between exercising their options and retaining the options for later use. By retaining 
the options, they maintain the right to purchase company stock at potentially more favorable 
conditions in the future. The downside of this strategy is that it involves substantial costs for 
the executive in terms of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Executive stock options typically 
have a maturity of 10 years and become vested after two to four years. This means that an 
executive cannot sell the options for several years. Furthermore, diversifying the exposure is 
problematic as executives are legally prohibited from short-selling their company's stock in 
the US. Given the large proportion of personal wealth tied to their company, diversification 
abilities across alternative investments are also limited. Lastly, besides the financial exposure, 
substantial human capital is also tied to the company (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
Consequently, executives can be considered as under-diversified investors who have large 
classification does not require a minimum threshold for in-the-moneyness and solely requires option holding 
until maturity. 
13 In their study of CEO overconfidence on acquisitions, Malmendier and Tate (2008) separate the 
overconfidence measure into two alternative measures to allow for time variation in the overconfidence 
classification. The first measure "Post-Longholder" is a dummy variable equal to one in all years after the CEO 
was classified for the first time as overconfident according to the above-described algorithm. The second 
measure "Pre-Longholder" is equal to one for the years before the CEO was first classified as overconfident. As 
shown in Section 5, our results hold with these alternative classifications. 
14 We test if our results hold if we use the measure proposed by Schrand and Zechman (2012) as a robustness 
check. 
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 exposure to their company's risk. Thus, a rational executive should divest as soon as the 
option is sufficiently in-the-money because the cost of delayed exercise typically exceeds its 
option value. In contrast, an executive who is overconfident about the firm's future return 
would not exercise stock options in these situations. 
3.2 Measurement of Big Bath Accounting 
Following Elliott and Shaw (1988), all firm-years with special items (SPI, Compustat 
item #17) less than minus one percent of total assets are classified as big bath accounting 
years. Special items include any non-recurring items, impairment of goodwill, non-recurring 
inventory write downs, bad debt expense, restructuring expense, and provisions for doubtful 
accounts.15 Although a non-discretionary element exists, it is likely to be clustered around 
time, not around CEO turnover. It might be that due to economic downturns or other 
exogenous shocks (e.g., natural disasters) special items occur predominantly in a specific 
year. This should not have an impact in our setting as CEO changes are distributed over a 
time span of 11 years for both groups (overconfident vs. rational) and both groups are 
approximately equally distributed over time. 
Besides the main variable of interest we include the following control variables which 
could influence earnings management behavior. We use Compustat to collect data on firm 
characteristics for the five years before and after CEO turnover. 
Firm Performance: Prior research suggests that weak firm performance is related to 
more aggressive earnings management. If current firm performance is poor, earnings are 
shifted from the future to the current period (e.g., DeFond and Park, 1997; Keating and 
Zimmerman, 1999). Furthermore, performance could be mechanically linked to the magnitude 
of special items since poor performance might trigger extraordinary write-offs. To control for 
15 In our sample about 75% of special items consists of asset write downs, goodwill impairment and restructuring 
costs (i.e., components where management has a particularly large valuation leeway). 
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 firm performance we include return on assets (ROA), which is EBIT (Compustat item #178) 
divided by total assets (Compustat item #6) at the beginning of the year. 
Firm Size: The size of the firm could also affect the earnings management behavior of 
managers. Skinner (1993), for example, shows that the size of the firm increases the 
likelihood of income-decreasing depreciation procedures. It might be that big bath accounting 
is related to the size of the company since more visible firms behave differently with respect 
to earnings manipulation. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in billion 
dollars. 
Debt: The leverage ratio of a firm is related to debt covenant violations. Various 
papers show that earnings are manipulated before and after debt covenant violations (e.g., 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Covenant violations are most often triggered 
by exceeding pre-set debt levels. Thus, we control for Leverage in all regressions and define 
Leverage as total debt (Compustat item #142) divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. 
Market-to-Book Ratio: Missing of earnings benchmarks such as analyst forecasts can 
be particularly severe for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan, 2002), giving those firms an 
especially strong incentive for earnings manipulations. To control for growth opportunities, 
we include the market-to-book ratio (MTB) in our regressions. MTB is equal to the market 
value of a company's assets (Compustat item #199 times item #25 plus item #10 plus item 
#181) divided by the book value of a company's assets (Compustat item #6). 
Corporate Governance: Weak internal control systems are often correlated with poor 
earnings quality (Doyle et al., 2006). In order to account for the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on earnings management, we include the "Entrenchment Index (E-
Index)" proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). As a robustness check, we also use the Gompers 
et al. (2003) governance index (G-Index). 
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 Managerial Compensation: Earnings-based compensation of CEOs provides several 
incentives to manipulate earnings. Holthausen et al. (1995) for instance show that managers 
engage in income-decreasing earnings management when bonus schemes are at their 
maximum. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) point out that earnings manipulations are 
especially prevalent if compensation is closely tied to firm value. We collect information 
about CEO compensation (bonus and salary) from ExecuComp. Bonus is defined as the 
annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. 
Routine vs. Non-Routine CEO Turnover: Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) show that 
big bath accounting is especially pronounced after non-routine turnover because in these cases 
negative outcomes can be attributed easily to the manager who has left the firm in discord. 
We hand-collect data on routine or non-routine turnover following Hazarika et al. (2012).16 
3.3 Model Specification 
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
Since executive stock options typically have long maturities (on average 10 years), 
only a limited number of executives have the chance to show overconfidence. This means that 
the sample consists of executives who hold the CEO position for a long time period. 
Executives, who are only active for a few years, cannot be classified because there is no 
information in ExecuComp as to whether these executives hold an option package until 
maturity. In order to avoid a bias towards rational executives, we limit our sample to those 
executives who have the chance to reveal themselves as overconfident or not. Of 6,670 CEOs 
contained in the ExecuComp database only 1,931 meet all required criteria17; 1,391 (72.04 
16 A managerial turnover is classified as non-routine "if (i) the CEO was fired, forced out from the position, or 
departed due to policy differences; or (ii) the departing CEO's age is less than 60, and the announcement does 
not report that the CEO died, left because of poor health, or accepted another position elsewhere or within the 
firm; or (iii) the CEO 'retires' but leaves the job within six months of the 'retirement announcement' " (Hazarika 
et al. 2012, 47). 
17 ExecuComp contains information on 38,286 executives. Of these, 13 executives have no annual compensation 
data; 31,603 executives have not been CEO in any year; 2,268 executives do not appear in ExecuComp between 
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 percent) are classified as rational and 540 (27.96 percent) are classified as overconfident. 
Furthermore, we delete financial institutions from the sample because of their special asset 
and thus impairment structure. 
We limit our sample to CEOs who stayed in post for at least five full years after the 
CEO turnover. Thereby, we ensure that the respective CEO can benefit from potential big 
bath accounting. Furthermore, we require our sample to have sufficient data prior to the 
turnover to control for abnormal earnings pattern before the new CEO steps in. Thus, we 
follow prior research and focus on an eleven-year window surrounding CEO turnover 
(Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). 
In total we consider 398 CEO changes. Of the 398 incoming CEOs, 272 (68.34 
percent) are classified as rational and 126 (31.66 percent) are classified as overconfident.18 
We do not condition on the type of the predecessor for two reasons. First, our overconfidence 
identification method allows us to classify only a limited number of these CEOs.19 Second 
and more importantly, knowledge of the behavioral type of the predecessor does not affect our 
empirical predictions and would, if anything, only make our empirical results stronger. 
Consider first the case where the predecessor is rational. If the successor is also rational, our 
hypothesis predicts that the successor will take a big bath. If the successor is overconfident, 
we argue that the successor is less likely to take a big bath. Alternatively, consider the case 
where the predecessor is overconfident. If the successor is rational, we would again expect to 
see a big bath, presumably even at a larger scale as the predecessor might have inflated asset 
values due to his upwardly biased beliefs. If the incoming CEOs are also overconfident, we 
again expect no or at least less big bath behavior than if the incoming CEOs are rational. 
2002 and 2010; 251 executives are dropped due to missing years; 192 executives have no option data; 135 
executives had no CRSP stock price data; 1,893 have no chance to reveal themselves as overconfident or rational 
due to unavailability of data until option maturity. 
18 Over time, the portion of CEOs classified as overconfident and those classified as rational is relatively stable. 
19 However, looking at the former CEOs for which we know the type, we find that 80 percent of them are 
rational and 20 percent overconfident. This is broadly in line with the proportions of our overall classification. 
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 Thus, in both cases we expect overconfident incoming CEOs to be less likely to take a big 
bath than rational incoming CEOs. 
Overall we have 4,378 firm-year observations (398 CEO turnovers * 11 years). Table 
1 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. −1.2 percent of total assets are on average 
written off in form of special items (SPI). 26 percent of all firms have more than one percent 
depreciation in the form of special items (Big Bath). The average return on assets (ROA) is 
10.8 percent, companies have average total assets (TA) of about 5.3 billion dollars and the 
average leverage ratio (Leverage) is 19.5 percent. The ratio of cash bonus to total cash salary 
(Bonus) has a mean of 39.2 percent. The average market-to-book ratio (MTB) is 
approximately two. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
SPI 4,378 −0.012 0.039 −0.225 −0.011 0.000 0.000 0.081 
Big Bath 4,378 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ROA 4,378 0.108 0.094 −0.258 0.061 0.104 0.156 0.406 
TA 4,378 5.306 11.334 0.036 0.491 1.435 4.381 81.499 
Size 4,378 0.428 1.587 −3.333 −0.712 0.361 1.477 4.401 
Leverage 4,378 0.195 0.155 0.000 0.068 0.183 0.285 0.794 
E−Index 4,378 2.475 1.123 0.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 6.000 
Bonus 4,378 0.392 0.181 0.000 0.389 0.421 0.448 0.755 
MTB 4,378 2.043 1.317 0.760 1.253 1.609 2.300 8.385 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the 11 years around CEO turnover. The sample includes all firms 
in the ExecuComp database as of December 2010 with CEO turnover, for which the incoming CEO could be 
classified as overconfident or rational and stayed in the company for at least five years. SPI is special items 
(unusual or nonrecurring) in $millions. Big Bath is a dummy variable which equals one if special items 
divided by total assets are less than minus one percent. ROA is return on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT 
divided by total assets. TA is total assets in $billion. Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s annual 
bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by total assets. 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are shown in Table 2. The CEO overconfidence 
proxy is not included in the correlation table as it is only available for the time period of the 
incoming CEO, while the other variables are given for the entire −5/+5 year period 
surrounding the CEO turnover. Special items (SPI) are positively correlated with ROA and 
Bonus while Big Bath is negatively correlated with these two variables.  
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 Table 2. Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
Variable SPI Big Bath ROA Size Leverage E-Index Bonus MTB 
SPI  −0.636*** 0.156*** 0.071*** 0.003 0.004 0.081*** −0.042*** 
Big Bath −0.787***  −0.127*** 0.005 0.034** −0.007 −0.096*** 0.009 
ROA 0.117*** −0.138***  0.089*** −0.127*** −0.065*** 0.195*** 0.409*** 
Size 0.000 0.003 0.023  0.196*** −0.003 0.140*** −0.104*** 
Leverage −0.023 0.016 −0.195*** 0.283***  0.041*** −0.022 −0.249*** 
E-Index −0.001 −0.017 −0.045*** 0.042*** 0.069***  −0.051*** −0.107*** 
Bonus 0.073*** −0.086*** 0.212*** 0.181*** −0.008 −0.018  0.146*** 
MTB 0.017 −0.019 0.6128*** −0.062*** −0.371*** −0.105*** 0.186***  
This table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. SPI 
is special items (unusual or nonrecurring) in $millions. Big Bath is a dummy variable which equals one if special 
items divided by total assets are less than minus one percent. ROA is return on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT 
divided by total assets. Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. E-Index is 
the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s annual bonus payment divided by the sum 
of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. ***,**,* 
indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
3.3.2 Big Bath Accounting Model 
The hypothesis is tested by estimating a logit model with big bath accounting as the 
dependent variable. Big bath accounting is a dummy variable which is equal to one if special 
items are less than minus one percent of total assets. Overconfident is equal to one if the hired 
CEO is classified as overconfident and equal to zero if the hired CEO is classified as rational. 
 (1) 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Results 
Table 3 presents univariate results for our hypothesis. Firms with overconfident CEOs 
are significantly less likely to use big bath accounting in the year of the turnover. While big 
bath accounting is used in 41.5 percent of the turnovers with rational incoming CEOs, only 
25.4 percent of the overconfident CEOs use big bath accounting. This is in line with our 
hypothesis (i.e., for overconfident managers the expected costs of big bath accounting seem to 
( ) ( )0 10.01Prob SPI logit Overconfident controls'β β γ< = + ∗ + ∗−
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 outweigh their perceived benefits). The univariate results show a significant difference in big 
bath accounting between overconfident and rational CEOs. 20 
Furthermore, in Table 3 we analyze how firms managed by overconfident CEOs differ 
from firms with rational CEOs in the year of the turnover. We find that firms managed by 
overconfident CEOs are smaller, have lower leverage ratios and better corporate governance 
than firms with rational CEOs. In our multivariate analysis below we include these company 
and manager characteristics in order to account for the heterogeneity of firms managed by 
rational and overconfident CEOs. 
Table 3. Univariate Results 
Variable N Overconfident=0 Overconfident=1 p-Value 
SPI 398 −0.023 −0.014 0.06 
Big Bath 398 0.415 0.254 0.00 
ROA 398 0.086 0.119 0.00 
TA 398 5.618 4.302 0.27 
Size 398 0.480 0.335 0.39 
Leverage 398 0.217 0.188 0.09 
E-Index 398 2.375 2.504 0.28 
Bonus 398 0.359 0.354 0.81 
MTB 398 1.943 2.074 0.37 
This table provides mean values of accounting and firm characteristics in the year of CEO turnover. The sample 
is divided into firms where the hired CEO is rational (Overconfident=0) or overconfident (Overconfident=1). 
Overconfident is a dummy variable which equals one if a manager holds executive stock options until the last 
year of maturity that are at least 40% in-the-money and zero otherwise. SPI is special items (unusual or 
nonrecurring) in $millions. Big Bath is a dummy variable which equals one if special items divided by total 
assets are less than minus one percent. ROA is return on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT divided by total assets. 
Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. 
MTB is market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. 
 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the univariate results presented in Table 3. Graph 1 
shows the average ratio of write-offs in special items to total assets separately for firms with 
overconfident and rational CEOs. Firms with overconfident CEOs have fewer write-offs in 
the year of the turnover compared to those with rational CEOs. By classifying negative 
special items of more than minus one percent of total assets as big bath accounting, Graph 2 
reveals that 16 percent more firms engage in big bath accounting when the incoming CEO is 
20 Big bath accounting occurred mainly in the last quarter of the respective fiscal year, supporting the argument 
that they were under the control of the incoming CEO. 
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 rational than when the incoming CEO is overconfident. Overall, the evidence in Figure 1 is 
consistent with our hypothesis that firms that hire overconfident CEOs are less likely to 
engage in big bath accounting.21 
Figure 1. Big Bath Accounting 
 
This figure presents percentages of firms that engage in big bath accounting during the 11-year 
window around CEO turnover for rational vs. overconfident incoming managers. In Graph 1, we 
show the level of special items over total assets. Graph 2 shows the percentage of firms with 
special items over total assets less than minus one percent for incoming overconfident CEOs and 
incoming rational CEOs. 
4.2 Routine vs. Non-Routine Turnover 
Whether a CEO change is routine or non-routine seems to be an important determinant 
in the decision to engage in big bath accounting (Pourciau, 1993; Wells, 2002). In order to 
rule out that our findings are a result of rational CEOs being mainly the successor in non-
routine turnover and overconfident CEOs being mainly the successor in routine turnover, we 
separately investigate big bath accounting for routine and non-routine changes. Graph 1 of 
Figure 2 distinguishes between routine and non-routine management changes. Consistent with 
21 We already observe an increase in special items in the year preceding the turnover. This finding is consistent 
with Pourciau (1993). 
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 Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) we find that big bath accounting is more frequent after non-
routine turnover (first graph). In the second graph we plot the proportion of firms engaging in 
big bath accounting for incoming overconfident and rational CEOs only after routine CEO 
turnover. Although we are only looking at routine changes, we still observe the same pattern 
as in Graph 1 and 2, suggesting that the difference between overconfident and rational CEOs 
is not driven by whether a management change is routine or non-routine.22 Overall, Figure 2 
indicates that the difference between overconfident and rational CEOs is not driven by 
whether a management change is routine or non-routine.  
 
Figure 2. Routine and Non-Routine Turnover 
 
This figure presents percentages of firms that engage in big bath accounting during the 11-year 
window around CEO turnover for non-routine vs. routine turnover (Graph 1) and for rational vs. 
overconfident incoming managers in routine turnover (Graph 2). Big bath accounting is defined as 
a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus one percent. 
22 We do not show the corresponding graph with only non-routine changes because of data constraints. Only 12 
CEO changes are non-routine where the incoming CEO is classified as overconfident. 
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 4.3 Justified vs. Unjustified Big Bath Accounting 
The large write-offs that we classify as big bath accounting might be justified by poor 
firm performance preceding the CEO turnover. To mitigate concerns that our results are 
driven by differences in inherent big bath accounting potential, we compare the firm 
performance (i.e., return on assets (ROA) and stock market performance) before the turnover 
year for firms that hire overconfident CEOs with those that hire rational CEOs. Furthermore, 
the use of large write-offs in prior years could limit the big bath accounting potential in the 
turnover year. Therefore, we additionally compare the use of large write-offs prior to the 
turnover year for both types of firms. In unreported results, we find that firms that hire a 
rational CEO perform similarly prior to the turnover year compared to firms that hire an 
overconfident CEO. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in the use of large write-
offs prior to the turnover. Consequently, both types of firms possess a similar big bath 
accounting potential in the year of the turnover.  
Next, we investigate whether incoming overconfident CEOs fail to execute a justified 
big bath in the turnover year. If poor firm performance asks for large write-offs and the 
incoming CEO fails to undertake them, then the necessary restructuring is only postponed and 
should ultimately materialize in subsequent years. Thus, we should observe a significantly 
larger fraction of firms taking a big bath in future years given that justified write-offs are 
delayed in the turnover year. In unreported results we find that firms managed by 
overconfident CEOs are not significantly more likely to take a big bath in the years following 
the turnover than firms managed by rational CEOs. If anything, they are less likely to do so. 
This finding is also supported graphically by Figure 1. 
In summary, our results are unlikely to be driven by either selection of rational CEOs 
into firms with more potential for justified large write-offs or by a failure of overconfident 
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 CEOs to exercise justified large write-offs in the turnover year. We further elaborate this point 
in a multivariate setting in the subsection “Potential of Big Bath Accounting”. 
4.4 Multivariate Results 
In our regressions we control for non-routine turnover events with an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the turnover was non-routine (or forced) and zero otherwise. In 
addition, we control for ROA, size, leverage, MTB, corporate governance mechanisms (E-
Index), and the bonus compensation of the CEO (Bonus). The models include industry and 
time fixed effects when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
To test the hypothesis that firms with overconfident CEOs engage less often in big 
bath accounting, we estimate logit regressions with a dummy variable as the dependent 
variable that is equal to one if a firm has less than minus one percent of total assets written off 
in form of special items. The marginal effects in Table 4 represent the change in the 
probability of engaging in big bath accounting for a one-unit change in the respective control 
variable evaluated at the mean of all other control variables. We find support for the 
hypothesis that overconfident CEOs engage less in big bath accounting than rational CEOs. In 
all of our specifications, overconfidence of the new CEO is negatively related to big bath 
accounting. On average it is about 15 percent less likely that an overconfident CEO will take a 
big bath, statistically significant at the one percent level. The effects of the control variables 
are in line with the findings of prior literature on big bath accounting. In particular, big bath 
accounting is more likely to occur when the turnover was non-routine. After a CEO has been 
fired or forced out, the new CEO will engage more often in large write-offs that can be 
attributed to his predecessor. 
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 Table 4. Big Bath Regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Overconfident −0.161*** −0.154*** −0.149*** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) 
Non-routine  0.146** 0.114 
  (0.069) (0.084) 
ROA   −0.681* 
   (0.379) 
Size   0.056*** 
   (0.019) 
Leverage   0.256 
   (0.185) 
E-index   −0.009 
   (0.023) 
Bonus   −0.643*** 
   (0.149) 
MTB   0.042* 
   (0.024) 
Observations 398 398 393 
Pseudo R² 0.019 0.028 0.196 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus one 
percent in the turnover year. The main variable of interest is Overconfident, which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the CEO is classified as overconfident and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets (ROA) 
measured as EBIT divided by total assets. Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total debt divided by 
total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s annual bonus 
payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of equity plus book value of debt divided 
by total assets. The regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within 
firms. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Results so far indicate a strong difference in the use of special items between firms 
hiring overconfident CEOs and those hiring rational CEOs in the turnover year. However, 
Figure 1 also indicates a somewhat more pronounced use of special items by firms hiring 
rational CEOs in the remaining years. For this reason we next investigate whether there is 
generally a significant difference in big bath accounting between both types of firms or 
whether the turnover year is indeed crucial. Table 5 reports the 11 years surrounding the CEO 
turnover. Consistent with the existing literature we find that firms are more likely to take a big 
bath in the year of the turnover (Year 0). After controlling for relevant firm, year, and industry 
fixed effects, there is generally no significant big bath accounting behavior in other years. The 
interaction terms of Overconfident with the respective years confirm that incoming 
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 overconfident CEOs have a significantly lower big bath accounting likelihood in the turnover 
year compared to rational CEOs (Year 0 x Overconfident). The effect also spills over to the 
subsequent year to some extent (Year 1 x Overconfident). In all but one of the remaining 
years, the difference in big bath accounting behavior between firms with rational vs. 
overconfident incoming CEOs is statistically insignificant.  
4.5 Addressing Endogeneity 
4.5.1 CEO Selection 
There might be firm characteristics which could influence the firm's decisions to hire 
an overconfident CEO and simultaneously explain the predicted big bath accounting pattern. 
For example, it might be that past performance influences the decision to hire an 
overconfident manager and leads to abnormal levels of special items. Furthermore, in a 
theoretical model, de la Rosa (2011) shows that if incoming CEOs are overconfident they will 
accept a contract with a higher performance payment and a lower base payment than rational 
candidates. 
We control for potential endogeneity by using a propensity score matching. In the first 
stage, we estimate a logit regression with a dummy as the dependent variable that is equal to 
one (zero) if the new manager is overconfident (rational). This gives us the conditional 
propensity of treatment (an overconfident manager) given certain observable covariates. 
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Table 5. Big Bath Regressions – All Years 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Year −4 0.050 0.048 0.035 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year −3 0.080** 0.073* 0.046 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Year −2 0.089** 0.078* 0.013 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) 
Year −1 0.162*** 0.143*** 0.062 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
Year 0 0.258*** 0.198*** 0.101* 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) 
Year 1 0.150*** 0.122*** 0.009 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) 
Year 2 0.101** 0.078* −0.027 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.044) 
Year 3 0.166*** 0.137*** 0.025 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) 
Year 4 0.114** 0.082* −0.014 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.047) 
Year 5 0.150*** 0.110** −0.013 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) 
Year −5 x Overconfident −0.012 −0.001 0.007 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Year −4 x Overconfident −0.110*** −0.105*** −0.103*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) 
Year −3 x Overconfident −0.077* −0.068 −0.055 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) 
Year −2 x Overconfident −0.091** −0.080* −0.063 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
Year −1 x Overconfident −0.066* −0.050 −0.049 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) 
Year 0 x Overconfident −0.116*** −0.101*** −0.092*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Year 1 x Overconfident −0.092** −0.084** −0.074** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Year 2 x Overconfident −0.045 −0.038 −0.042 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
Year 3 x Overconfident −0.049 −0.039 −0.039 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Year 4 x Overconfident −0.061 −0.048 −0.054 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
Year 5 x Overconfident −0.086** −0.071* −0.060 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) 
Observations 4,378 4,378 4,378 
Pseudo R² 0.019 0.039 0.084 
Control Variables No Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus one 
percent in the turnover year. The main variable of interest is Overconfident, which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the CEO is classified as overconfident and zero otherwise. The regressions include industry and 
year dummies as well as all control variables used in Table 4 when indicated. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within 
firms. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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 We control for CEO characteristics (age, delta, and vega, see below) and firm 
characteristics (firm age and three year averages of ROA, special items, leverage, and size 
prior to the CEO turnover) and additionally for overconfidence of the outgoing CEO. 23 
Following Core and Guay (2002), we define Delta as the sensitivity of the CEO's stock and 
option portfolios with respect to changes in the value of the company's stock price and Vega 
as the sensitivity of the CEO's stock and option portfolio with respect to a change in the 
company's stock return volatility. Additionally, we include a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the turnover was non-routine.24 The unreported regression results suggest that firm size 
and the magnitude of incentive-based compensation have an impact on the decision to hire an 
overconfident CEO. Smaller firms and firms with stronger incentive-based compensation are 
more likely to hire overconfident CEOs. 25  The magnitude of special items prior to the 
turnover is not related to the decision to hire an overconfident manager. The behavioral type 
of the outgoing CEO does also not explain the type of the incoming CEO. This suggests that 
firms that hire overconfident CEOs do not generally favor this type of manager or that 
overconfident CEOs select themselves into a special type of firms. To this extent, our PSM 
procedure also rules out that time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics drive the choice 
to hire a CEO of a certain behavioral type.26 
In the second step, we match two firms which have the same propensity of hiring an 
overconfident CEO based on the logit regression of the first stage but where in fact one of the 
firms hired an overconfident CEO (treatment) and the other firm hired a rational CEO 
23 With our overconfidence classification based on Malmendier and Tate (2005) we are able to identify only a 
limited number of outgoing managers. Therefore, overconfidence is measured analogue to Schrand and Zechman 
2012 because every manager can be classified as either overconfident or rational. Managers are identified as 
overconfident if the dollar value of their exercisable options exceed the industry median based on two-digit SIC 
codes. 
24 The number of observations drops from 398 to 253 due to missing values for some variables. 
25 As a robustness test we also control for delta and vega in our baseline regression (i.e., whether firms hiring 
overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big bath accounting). The results remain unchanged when 
controlling for delta and vega. However, doing this reduces our sample size significantly due to missing 
information for some executives. Therefore, we do not include delta and vega in our main analysis. 
26 We acknowledge that there might also be time-variant unobservable factors that influence the choice to hire an 
overconfident CEO. However, conditioning on them is naturally impossible. 
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 (control). We use the nearest neighbor matching method which matches two pairs with the 
lowest propensity score differences. We use a caliper of five percentage points which means 
that we do not match a treatment firm with a control firm if the difference in the propensity 
scores is larger than five percentage points. On the one hand, this restriction ensures that the 
matched pairs are similar across the observable variables. On the other hand, this reduces the 
number of matched pairs. The results of the propensity score matched model in Table 6 
confirm our previous results. Across all models overconfident managers are less likely to 
engage in big bath accounting. Firms with an overconfident incoming CEO are up to 20 
percent less likely to engage in big bath accounting than firms with a rational incoming CEO. 
Table 6. Big Bath Regressions – Matched on CEO Type 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 PSM PSM PSM 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Overconfident −0.157** −0.161** −0.202** 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.100) 
Non-routine  0.327*** 0.398** 
  (0.108) (0.171) 
ROA   −0.776 
   (0.524) 
Size   0.059 
   (0.037) 
Leverage   0.435 
   (0.317) 
E-index   0.040 
   (0.046) 
Bonus   −0.784*** 
   (0.260) 
MTB   0.071** 
   (0.033) 
Observations 166 166 153 
Pseudo R² 0.022 0.063 0.296 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable of a 
propensity score matched model (PSM). Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items 
over total assets are less than minus one percent in the turnover year. The main variable of interest is 
Overconfident, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is classified as overconfident and zero 
otherwise. ROA is return on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT divided by total assets. Size is total assets in log 
$billion. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. 
Bonus is a manager’s annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by total assets. The regressions include industry and year dummies when 
indicated. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-
independent observations within firms. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively. 
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 4.5.2 Potential of Big Bath Accounting 
Another form of self-selection, which might affect our results, is the potential of big 
bath accounting. It might be that for some reasons overconfident (rational) managers self-
select into firms with lower (higher) inherent big bath potential. To rule out that there are 
differences with respect to the possibility to engage in an earnings bath, we perform an 
additional propensity score matching. In the first stage we model the likelihood to take an 
earnings bath based on past and current performance as well as past special items. The 
rationale for this is that poor current and recent firm performance might yield more potential 
for big bath accounting (e.g., impairments) than if the company was performing well. To rule 
out that special items occurred in the former years we include special items as controls. 
Furthermore, it might be that big bath accounting is related to the size of the company since 
more visible firms behave differently with respect to earnings manipulation. We estimate the 
following model within all firm years of the Compustat Database. 
 
(2) 
In untabulated results the first stage reveals that the current ROA is significantly 
negatively related and size is significantly positive related to big bath accounting. Based on 
the first stage we generate matched pairs of firms with rational CEOs and firms with 
overconfident CEOs, which have the same propensity to engage in big bath accounting. We 
match each pair with the nearest neighbor without replacement and we use a caliper of five 
percentage points. The results in Table 7 show that our results are not affected by the 
matching design. Thus, our results are not driven by overconfident managers self-selecting 
into companies with lower inherent big bath potential. 
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 Table 7. Big Bath Regressions – Matched on Big Bath Potential 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 PSM PSM PSM 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Overconfident −0.184*** −0.179*** −0.205*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.079) 
Non-routine  0.184* 0.200* 
  (0.099) (0.120) 
ROA   −1.436** 
   (0.544) 
Size   0.093*** 
   (0.030) 
Leverage   0.627*** 
   (0.215) 
E-index   −0.011 
   (0.035) 
Bonus   −0.649*** 
   (0.227) 
MTB   0.092*** 
   (0.033) 
Observations 228 228 208 
Pseudo R² 0.029 0.042 0.238 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than the 
specified threshold in each model in the turnover year. The main variable of interest is Overconfident, which is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is classified as overconfident and zero otherwise. ROA is return 
on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT divided by total assets. Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total 
debt divided by total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s 
annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by total assets. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within 
firms. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1 Alternative Measures of Overconfidence 
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the chosen 
overconfidence classification parameters. Table 8 repeats our analyses of big bath accounting 
using alternative overconfidence classifications.  
We consider four alternatives to identify CEOs as overconfident or rational. 
Alternatives 1 and 2 follow our original procedure and classify CEOs as overconfident if they 
ever hold an option until the final maturity year, which is sufficiently deep in the money. 
Alternative 1 (2) thereby considers a moneyness of 20 percent (60 percent) as sufficient.  
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 In alternative 3 we follow Sen and Tumarkin (2009) and classify CEOs as 
overconfident based on their holdings of company stock. This method follows the same 
rationale as the option based classification method. As executives typically have strong 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk, they should hold as little of their company's stock as possible. 
However, according to Core and Larcker (2002), firms often require that their top executives 
hold a minimum of company stock. This requirement is often stated in terms of multiples of 
the executive’s salary. If the executive holds more company stock than required by company 
constitutions, the executive is considered to be overconfident with respect to the future 
performance of the firm. Following Sen and Tumarkin (2009), we classify CEOs as 
overconfident when their holdings of company stock exceed the median of the ratio of stock 
holdings-to-salary. 
In alternative 4, we investigate whether CEO overconfidence can be treated as a time-
invariant personal characteristic of the CEO. In particular, we consider only observations on 
big bath accounting reported before the year in which the respective CEO was first classified 
as overconfident. If CEO overconfidence only manifests after this point in time, there should 
be no effect in prior periods. 
Alternative 5 uses the classification based on Schrand and Zechman (2012). CEOs are 
classified as overconfident or rational based on the moneyness of their exercisable options. In 
particular, managers are identified as overconfident if the dollar value (measured as the 
difference between the current stock price and the average exercise price of the options times 
the number of options held) of their exercisable options exceeds the industry median based on 
two-digit SIC codes.27 
27 We further normalize the dollar value of exercisable options by total sales to avoid that mostly CEOs in large 
companies are classified as overconfident because large companies usually grant more options to their managers. 
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 Overall, our results are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence. Firms with 
CEOs classified as overconfident are significantly less likely to engage in big bath accounting 
in the turnover year in all settings, independent of the classification method used. 
Table 8. Big Bath Regressions – Alternative Overconfidence Classifications 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Overconfident (20) −0.114**     
 (0.056)     
Overconfident (60)  −0.126**    
  (0.058)    
Voluntary Holder   −0.155***   
   (0.057)   
Pre-Longholder    −0.145***  
    (0.056)  
Overconfident (SZ)     −0.098* 
     (0.054) 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 
Pseudo R² 0.190 0.191 0.194 0.194 0.189 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus one 
percent in the turnover year. In Model 1, CEOs are classified as overconfident if they ever held an option until 
the final maturity year, which is at least 20 percent in the money. Model 2 uses the same classification method 
with a moneyness threshold of 60 percent. Model 3 classifies CEOs as overconfident if they held more company 
stock than required by company constitutions. Model 4 considers only big bath accounting that occurred before 
the year in which the CEOs were classified as overconfident (i.e., before they held an option until the final 
maturity year for the first time, which is at least 40 percent in the money). In Model 5, CEOs are identified as 
overconfident if the moneyness of their exercisable options exceeds the industry median based on 2-digit SIC 
codes following Schrand and Zechman (2012). The regressions furthermore include all control variables used in 
Table 4. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within firms. ***,**,* indicate 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
5.2 Alternative Big Bath Thresholds 
This section tests the robustness of our results related to our hypothesis with respect to 
the measurement of big bath accounting. Table 9 replicates the regressions of Table 4 with 
different classification thresholds for big bath accounting. In particular, model (1) defines big 
bath accounting as negative special items, model (2) as special items over total assets less 
than minus 0.5 percent, model (3) as less than minus one percent, model (4) as less than 
minus 1.5 percent, and model (5) as less than minus two percent. The results suggest that our 
findings are not sensitive to the measurement of big bath accounting. Firms hiring an 
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 overconfident CEO rather than a rational CEO are less likely to engage in big bath 
accounting. The effect is statistically significant in all but the most stringent threshold (model 
5). However, the lack of significance for this specification is likely to be due to the small 
number of observations classified as big bath. 
Table 9. Big Bath Regressions – Alternative Big Bath Thresholds 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 < 0.000 < 0.005 < 0.010 < 0.015 < 0.020 
Dependent Variable Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath Big Bath 
Overconfident −0.186*** −0.159*** −0.149*** −0.151*** −0.071 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.054) (0.048) (0.046) 
Non-routine 0.162** 0.091 0.114 0.038 0.024 
 (0.077) (0.086) (0.084) (0.072) (0.060) 
ROA −0.262 −0.598 −0.681* −0.684** −0.723** 
 (0.415) (0.409) (0.379) (0.332) (0.302) 
Size 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.045** 0.029* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) 
Leverage 0.338* 0.325 0.256 0.218 0.078 
 (0.200) (0.203) (0.185) (0.165) (0.144) 
E-Index 0.009 0.007 −0.009 −0.016 −0.015 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) 
Bonus −0.631*** −0.643*** −0.643*** −0.568*** −0.454*** 
 (0.154) (0.156) (0.149) (0.135) (0.116) 
MTB 0.127 0.042 0.042* 0.025 0.032 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 
Pseudo R² 0.172 0.184 0.196 0.183 0.155 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. 
Big Bath is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than the 
specified threshold in each model in the turnover year. The main variable of interest is Overconfident, which is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is classified as overconfident and zero otherwise. ROA is return 
on assets (ROA) measured as EBIT divided by total assets. Size is total assets in log $billion. Leverage is total 
debt divided by total assets. E-Index is the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Bonus is a manager’s 
annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by total assets. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the firm level to account for non-independent observations within 
firms. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
5.3 Impact of the CFO 
Accounting policies are likely to be influenced not only by the CEO but also by the 
CFO of a company. For that reason, we additionally analyze our hypothesis in the setting of 
CFO turnover. We find no evidence that CFO overconfidence has the same influence on big 
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 bath accounting in the year of appointment as that of the CEO.28 This could be due to two 
reasons: First, it could be that it is the CEO who shapes the accounting policy of a firm and 
the CFO is of minor importance in this respect. Second, we consider it unlikely that a new 
CFO will engage in big bath accounting because large write-offs would portray the current 
CEO in a bad light. 
6. Conclusion 
There is a dark and a bright side of managerial overconfidence. So far the existing 
literature mostly focuses on the dark side and highlights circumstances in which 
overconfidence leads to excessive risk-taking or other harmful actions by the respective 
manager. In this paper, however, we argue that there is also a bright side of managerial 
overconfidence and this behavioral feature could be beneficial in certain situations. In 
particular, we investigate whether overconfident managers engage less in big bath accounting 
after their appointment. Incoming overconfident managers believe that their companies' 
projects will realize higher earnings in the future when managed by them. Consequently they 
feel less need to transfer current earnings to the future and are thus less likely to engage in big 
bath accounting. Rational managers, however, do not have this upwardly biased belief and are 
hence more susceptible to engage in a big bath earnings manipulation. As manipulating 
earnings is generally not in the interests of stakeholders, we consider overconfidence as a 
beneficial feature in this situation. 
By analyzing a sample of 398 CEO turnovers, we find evidence that is consistent with 
this suspected accounting behavior. We find less big bath accounting in firms where the new 
CEO is overconfident. Our findings are robust to alternative overconfidence classifications, 
big bath accounting definitions, the endogenous choice of hiring an overconfident CEO, 
28 It should be noted that we are only able to identify a small number of CFOs as overconfident or rational. This 
could limit the power of our empirical results in these tests. 
 80 
                                                 
 endogenous big bath potential, and to several alternative explanations of accounting behavior 
at the turnover time, such as the turnover type (routine vs. non-routine), managerial 
compensation, and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Our results imply that managerial overconfidence cannot be deemed as harmful in 
general but needs to be considered in the overall context. We highlight a situation where 
rational managers manipulate earnings for their private benefits, while overconfident 
managers see no need for such an activity.  
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 Appendix A. Overconfidence Classification 
We classify executives as overconfident if they ever retain an option until one year 
before expiration even though the option was at minimum 40 percent in the money at the 
time. Before 2006, ExecuComp contained information on option holdings only in an 
aggregated form and not at the grant level. Thus, we use information on the granting and 
exercising of options in order to infer the option holdings at a grant level. Option grants are 
provided in detail in the ExecuComp tables STGRTTAB and PLANBASEDAWARDS. 
Option exercises are only given in an aggregated form in the table ANNCOMP. Thus, 
ExecuComp only states how many options were exercised but not from which option grant. 
Therefore, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and assume a first-in first-out (FIFO) 
allocation rule in order to infer the option holdings per year. However, similar to Hall and 
Liebman (1998) we encountered several problems in the construction of the option holding 
portfolios. In the following, we describe the treatment of the respective issues. 
Missing Information for Option Grants 
For each option grant we need to know the number of options granted, the expiration date and 
the exercise price. Information on option grants is given in the ExecuComp tables 
STGRTTAB (for the years until 2006) and PLANBASEDAWARDS (for the years 2006 
onwards). PLANBASEDAWARDS does not contain the expiration date of the grant but 
OUTSTANDINGAWARDS does and this can be added to the respective option grants. If the 
assignment of the exercise date was unclear, we assume that the options expire 10 years after 
the grant date as the median maturity for all option grants was 10 years. If the grant date was 
missing, we assume that the options were granted at fiscal year-end. If the exercise price was 
missing, we assume that the options were granted at the money and thus replaced missing 
exercise prices with the stock price of the company at the grant date as given by the 
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 ExecuComp variable "mktpric" or, if this variable is not available, with the CRSP stock price 
of the company at the grant date. 
Inconsistencies in Granted Options between PLANBASEDAWARDS & STGRTTAB and 
ANNCOMP 
We compare whether the number of options granted given in the detail tables 
(STGRTTAB and PLANBASEDAWARDS) coincides with the information given in the 
general annual compensation table (ANNCOMP). In about 95 percent of the cases the 
information is the same. For the remaining observations the difference almost exclusively 
arises because there is information on granted options in ANNCOMP without any information 
on the grant details in either STGRTTAB or PLANBASEDAWARDS. In these cases, we add 
the information by assuming that the options were granted in a single grant at the money at 
fiscal year-end. 
Gaps in Compensation Reporting 
We check whether there are gaps in the compensation reporting in ExecuComp. If this 
is the case, we cannot track the exercise behavior of the executive and the construction of the 
annual option portfolios would be inaccurate. However, when there is only a one-year gap, the 
missing information can be added by comparing the option holdings of the previous and 
following years. When the number of options held was larger in the following year than in the 
previous year, we assume that the additional options were granted in a single grant at the 
money at fiscal year-end of the missing year. When the number of options in the following 
year was smaller than in the previous year, we assume that the difference was exercised in the 
missing year. In this we apply the first-in first-out principle and assume that the oldest options 
were exercised first. 
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 Initial Option Holdings 
In order to apply the FIFO-algorithm, we need to know the executive's entire history 
of option grants and exercises. However, sometimes the executive held options of the 
company before the first information on an option grant was listed in ExecuComp. If this was 
the case, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and assume that these options were granted 
three years earlier and have seven years left until expiration, i.e. they were granted with a 10-
year maturity. We further assume that the options were granted at the money at fiscal year-
end. To alleviate this problem, we again follow Hall and Liebman (1998) by tracking back 
option grants and exercises for 10 years before constructing the first option holding portfolio. 
Since ExecuComp covers data since 1992, we construct the first option holding portfolio for 
the year 2002. If the executive still holds options before 1992, we impose the assumptions 
discussed above. 
Inconsistencies in Option Holdings between FIFO-Algorithm & ANNCOMP 
Sometimes the FIFO-algorithm resulted in a different number of options held by the 
executive than the number stated in the annual compensation table ANNCOMP. If this was 
the case, we follow Hall and Liebman (1998) and impose the following assumptions to the 
option holdings. When the number of options held by the executive given in ANNCOMP is 
smaller than the number produced by the FIFO-algorithm, we assume that either some 
exercises are missing in ExecuComp or that some options have expired. Therefore, we 
subtract the difference from the oldest option grants. When the number of options held given 
in ANNCOMP is larger than the number given by the FIFO-algorithm, we assume that too 
many options were exercised and add back the exercised options until both numbers match. If 
adding back proved insufficient, the option holdings are rescaled proportionally such that they 
coincide with the number of options held given in ANNCOMP. 
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 Adjustment for Stock Splits 
The number of options held and the exercise price need to be adjusted for stock splits. 
We obtain information on stock splits directly from ExecuComp. When this information is 
missing we assume that there was no stock split in the given year. 
Chance to Reveal Overconfidence 
As discussed above, an executive needs to hold options until one year before 
expiration in order to be classified as overconfident. If ExecuComp does not cover this time 
period, no overconfidence can be identified. Therefore, we exclude all executives that had no 
chance to reveal themselves as being overconfident.  
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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the reporting choices of firms in European exchange-regulated 
markets. In particular, it sheds light on the voluntary adoption of IFRS and on the decision to 
voluntarily provide quarterly financial data. The results show that less than 20% of the firms 
listed in the exchange-regulated markets of Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Paris 
voluntarily adopt IFRS and that less than 20% voluntarily provide quarterly reports. Even 
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 1. Introduction 
Today many initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe are not within the EU-regulated 
markets but in the European exchange-regulated markets. Since the start of the exchange-
regulated Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) in 2005 for example, there 
are more IPOs in the Entry Standard than in Frankfurts EU-regulated Prime and General 
Standard (105 vs. 93). Thus, European exchange-regulated markets are of growing 
importance.  
Firms listed in these markets are usually not required to disclose any quarterly 
information and most exchange-regulated markets allow listed firms to choose between local 
GAAP and IFRS.1 Regulation 2002/1606/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
requires publicly listed European firms to prepare their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS only if they are listed in a EU-regulated market. Hence, this does not 
apply to exchange-regulated markets (2002/1606/EC, Article 4).  
Stock exchanges state that the main advantage of exchange-regulated markets are 
lower costs compared to EU-regulated markets especially due to lower disclosure 
requirements. Firms that self select into these markets can voluntarily provide more disclosure 
or voluntarily adopt IFRS. Then the question arises why these firms self select into a market 
with lower disclosure requirements in the first place. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to 
shed light on the reporting choices of firms listed in these markets. In particular, I am 
interested in the decision to voluntarily adopt IFRS at the admission to these markets and to 
voluntarily provide quarterly financial information after admission to these markets.  
The sample consists of 226 new admissions to the exchange-regulated markets of 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Paris. First, I show that overall less than 20% of 
1 The notable exception is the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange which requires 
IFRS since 2007. 
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 firms voluntarily prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS. This finding 
suggests that most firms listed in exchange-regulated markets in Europe do not conclude that 
the benefits of IFRS outweigh the costs. Furthermore, less than 20% provide any quarterly 
financial information. Even among the voluntary IFRS adopters more than 65% of firms do 
not provide any quarterly information. Second, I separately investigate determinants of 
voluntary IFRS adoption and determinants of providing voluntary quarterly financial 
information. 
The first determinant model reveals that firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt 
IFRS if they offer their stocks directly to institutional investors before the listing (private 
placement) compared to a public offer to all investors. Private placements to institutional 
investors hereby serve as a proxy for diversified investors in contrast to under-diversified 
retail investors (e.g. Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). In a similar vein, I find that the proportion 
of institutional owners prior to the admission is positively linked to the probability of 
voluntarily adopting IFRS.  
A future upgrade into a EU-regulated market is positively related to IFRS adoption. 
Furthermore, foreign firms and bigger firms are more likely do adopt IFRS voluntarily. This 
is in line with prior literature (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; 
Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 2009). 
The second determinant model shows that voluntary disclosure of quarterly financials 
is positively related to a future upgrade into a EU-regulated market, but not to the offers to 
institutional investors. Thus, firms voluntarily adopt IFRS and voluntarily provide quarterly 
information when anticipating a future upgrade into a EU-regulated market.  
The finding that the proportion of diversified investors is positively associated with 
voluntary IFRS adoption, but not with an increase in quarterly reporting might be explained 
by the relative importance of comparability effects compared to transparency effects. Firms 
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 that voluntarily adopt IFRS now use the same set of rules as firms of the EU-regulated 
markets. Diversified investors might benefit from these effects more than non-diversified 
retail investors since the same set of rules potentially reduces costs of managing their 
portfolio.  
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, I describe the reporting choices in 
European exchange-regulated markets and show that only a small fraction of firms listed in 
these markets voluntarily adopts IFRS or voluntarily provides quarterly financial information. 
Second, the results give some indications that diversified investors prefer the use of IFRS, but 
are not more interested in quarterly disclosure than non-diversified investors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide details 
about the exchange-regulated markets in Europe. Section 3 contains the related literature. In 
Section 4, I describe the sample and the research design. Section 5 presents and Section 6 
discusses my results. Section 6 shows robustness tests and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional Setting 
Regulation 2002/1606/EC requires listed firms to prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). More 
precisely, the regulation only requires firms that are listed in a EU-regulated market to use 
IFRS. Regulation 2002/1606/EC refers to Article 1(13) of Directive 93/22/EEC that provides 
a definition of EU-regulated markets. A EU-regulated market complies “with all reporting and 
transparency requirements laid down pursuant to Articles 20 and 21” (e.g. reporting prices 
every 20 minutes) and it “appears on the list”. The latter requirement means that a market is 
EU-regulated if it is recognized as such by the respective authority. In a nutshell, stock 
exchanges can opt for a EU-regulated market or an exchange-regulated market. The 
responsible authorities are usually the Ministries of Finance or Economy of the respective 
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 member state. The following table contains exchange-regulated markets within the EU that 
permit IFRS and local GAAP. 
Table 1. European Exchange-Regulated Markets that Allow Voluntary IFRS Adoption 
Market Segment Stock Exchange Listed Equities* 
AIM Italia  Borsa Italiana 26 
Entry Standard  Frankfurt Stock Exchange 187 
Euro MTF  Bourse Luxembourg 260 
m:access  Munich Stock Exchange 51 
NYSE Alternext Amsterdam  New York Stock Exchange 2 
NYSE Alternext Brussels  New York Stock Exchange 10 
NYSE Alternext Lisbon  New York Stock Exchange 5 
NYSE Alternext Paris  New York Stock Exchange 145 
Third market  Vienna Stock Exchange 4 
The table contains European exchange-regulated markets that allow listed firms to choose between IFRS and 
local GAAP.  
* as of July 2013 
Table 2 compares characteristics of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange market segments 
and the NYSE market segments in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris. The minimum 
free float of the exchange-regulated market of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Entry Standard) 
is 10% versus 25% of the EU-regulated markets (Prime Standard and General Standard). The 
listing fees and ongoing fees of the EU-regulated markets are higher compared to the 
exchange regulated markets. The table only displays minimum fees; usually, fees are 
increasing in the value of listed shares.  
Most exchange-regulated markets have different (lower) reporting requirements 
compared to EU-regulated markets. Both the Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
and the Alternext markets of the NYSE allow listed firms to choose between local GAAP and 
IFRS and do not require quarterly financial reports. Thus, this paper looks into the decisions 
of firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS and to voluntarily issue quarterly financial information. 2 
Furthermore, exchange-regulated markets are not subject to the enforcement systems 
that are required by the European Commission. Regulation 1606/2002/EC, which requires 
2 This paper does not include the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
since the LSE requires AIM firms to use IFRS since 2007 and to publish shortened quarterly reports. 
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 member states to install “appropriate measures to ensure compliance with international 
accounting standards” (Article 16), is only applicable for firms listed in EU-regulated 
markets.  
Table 2. Characteristics of Selected Stock Market Segments 
 
Frankfurt  
Stock Exchange 
NYSE  
(Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Paris) 
 
EU- 
Regulated 
Exchange-
Regulated 
EU- 
Regulated 
Exchange-
Regulated 
Market Segment 
Prime 
Standard 
General 
Standard 
Entry  
Standard Euronext Alternext 
GAAP System IFRS IFRS Local or IFRS IFRS Local or IFRS 
Semi-Annual Statements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarterly Statements Yes No No Yes No 
Free Float 25% 25% 10% 25% 0% 
Minimum Equity Capital 1,250,000 1,250,000 730,000 5,000,000    2,500,000    
Preceding Years  3 3 2 2 2* 
Minimum Admission Fee 5,500 5,500 750 10,000 9,000 
Minimum Annual Fee 10,000    7,500    5,000    5,000    3,000    
The table provides characteristics of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange market segments and the NYSE markets 
segments in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris.   
* recommended  
So far, only little research has been conducted in the exchange-regulated markets in 
Europe. Pownall and Wieczynska (2012) find that in 2009 16% of their sample of 2,580 listed 
EU firms are still using local GAAP. They conclude that firms from the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) may drive this finding. 
Vismara et al. (2012) show that the performance in these secondary markets is worse than in 
the main markets (measured as buy-and-hold return). This result is consistent with the 
findings of Gerakos et al. (2013). They provide evidence that the performance of firms listed 
in the AIM is worse compared to firms of LSE’s EU-regulated markets. A survey of the 
Deutsches Aktieninstitut (German Equities Institute, DAI) shows that 70% of the respondents 
are not satisfied with the liquidity of their shares in the Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore, 70% agree with the statement that the use of local GAAP is an 
advantage of this market segment. However, the survey is only based on 22 responses (out of 
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 117 questionnaires). To my knowledge, there is no evidence on reporting decisions in the 
exchange-regulated markets.  
To gain a deeper understanding on the characteristics of firms that list in exchange-
regulated markets, I investigate determinants of firms listed in the Entry Standard and in the 
EU-regulated markets (Prime Standard and General Standard) of the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. Since the introduction of the Entry Standard in April 2005 there were 105 IPOs in 
the Entry Standard and 93 IPOs in the Prime and General Standard. Unreported results show 
that firms are more likely to list in the EU-regulated markets if the market capitalization and 
institutional ownership upon IPO are bigger. Average market capitalization of IPOs in the 
EU-regulated markets of the FSE is 656 million Euros and of the exchange-regulated Entry 
Standard 51 million Euros. Firms that perform an IPO in the exchange-regulated markets are 
more often owned by board members and their families compared to firms from the EU-
regulated markets (50% vs. 20%).  
3. Literature Review on Voluntary IFRS Adoption and Interim Reporting 
There are some studies that focus on the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption of 
publicly listed firms. The most common findings in single and cross-country studies are that 
voluntary adopters are more internationally oriented, more often cross-listed, and bigger 
(Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; 
Wu and Zhang, 2009). Ownership concentration is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of firms adopting IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; 
Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 2009; Günther et al., 2009).3 
A few studies look into the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption of private firms. 
Francis et al. (2008) provide evidence that especially internationally operating private firms 
and those seeking external financing adopt IFRS voluntarily. Bassemir (2012) finds that 
3 A detailed literature review of the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoption can be found in Andre et al. (2012). 
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 German firms voluntarily adopting IFRS are bigger, externally rated, more leveraged, have a 
Big 5 auditor4, more growth opportunities, a private equity investor, and seek public debt or 
equity financing. Andre et al. (2012) show that UK unlisted firms are more likely to adopt 
IFRS if they are bigger, more leveraged, internationally oriented, and have a Big 4 auditor. To 
the best of my knowledge, there is no study directly investigating voluntary adoption of IFRS 
in exchange-regulated markets.  
The samples of most studies that focus on voluntary adoption of IFRS have a high 
proportion of German and Swiss companies. These studies find that adopting firms are 
relatively large and internationally oriented. For example, the average market capitalization of 
German voluntary adopters is 1,925 million Euros, 35% of sales are foreign sales and on 
average they are listed on 2.154 exchanges (Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006). Average total assets 
of the Swiss sample of Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) are 2,529 million Euros and foreign 
sales account for 55% of total sales. Thus, studies looking into determinants and 
consequences of those firms are not representative for firms listed in the European exchange-
regulated markets. For comparison: Firms listed in the Entry Standard of the FSE have a 
market capitalization of 48 million Euros on average. Further, firms of the exchange-regulated 
markets are less often owned by institutional investors, but by managers and/or founders (and 
their families). Hence, there is no clear prediction to what extent firms of exchange-regulated 
markets voluntarily adopt IFRS.  
Another stream of literature deals with interim disclosure. Increasing the frequency of 
disclosure can help to decrease information asymmetries and in turn can lead to more liquid 
capital markets (Botosan and Harris, 2000). The increase in frequency of disclosure can 
enhance the timeliness and the content of information. More timely information is useful for 
investors since it is closer to the time they trade. Higher frequency increases the content if 
4 In Germany, BDO is often viewed as one of the dominating auditors (besides Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, 
and PWC). 
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 quarterly reports reveal information about seasonal trends (Botosan and Harris, 2000). Butler 
et al. (2007) find that for firms issuing voluntarily quarterly financial statements the 
timeliness of earnings increase. 
The downside of increasing the frequency, however, is managers’ deviation of 
otherwise optimal behavior. Bhojraj and Libby (2005) show that when managers are faced 
with high capital market pressure, managers behave more myopically when they report 
quarterly compared to semi-annually. The authors explain this finding by the conflict between 
short-term earnings incentives and total cash flows. Similarly, Ernstberger et al. (2011) find 
that increased frequency of disclosure can lead to more real activities manipulation to meet 
and beet quarterly earnings benchmarks. Another drawback of quarterly reporting is a 
potential increase in price volatility (Rahman et al., 2007). 
4. Sample and Research Design 
4.1 Sample 
The sample consists of all IPOs, private placements and direct listings in the European 
exchange-regulated markets of Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Paris for the 
years 2005-2012. 5  Within an IPO, firms raise capital and frequently offer shares of the 
existing shareholders. Private placements are offers in form of a capital increase to qualified 
investors only prior to a listing. 6  Article 2 of Directive 2003/71/EC defines and gives 
examples of qualified investors (e.g. credit institutions, investment firms, and insurance 
companies).7 Direct listings are only the admission to a market without capital raised. The 
5 All of the mentioned exchanges were installed in 2005 or thereafter.  
6 The following quote illustrates the information, which is given upon a listing at the Paris Alternext market 
segment. “Admission on Alternext 2,543,318 existing shares representing the outstanding capital of ASTELLIA. 
This admission takes place after a Private Placement of M€ 10 subscribed by qualified investors (M€ 8 from a 
capital increase)” (admission of Astellia on 12/17/2007).  
7 Natural persons can be authorized as qualified investors by member states if they exceed two of the following 
criteria: at least 10 transactions of significant size in each of the last four quarters, at least one year of 
professional experience, the investors’ portfolio exceeds 0.5 million Euros (2003/71/EC Article 2).  
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 sample does not include dual listings (cross-listings) from other markets or downlistings from 
EU-regulated markets since the incentive schemes might be different. 
In total, I found 251 new admissions. Due to data availability (missing prospectus or 
missing capital market data) the sample reduces to 226 firms. The data is hand collected and 
mostly stems from issued prospectus and financial statements. Data is gathered from the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, German Federal Financial Advisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Bafin), the German Federal Gazette, New York Stock 
Exchange and the companies.  
Table 3 shows that 45 out of 226 firms (19.9%) decided to voluntarily adopt IFRS and 
42 (18.6%) decided to provide quarterly information upon their admission to the European 
exchange-regulated markets. These descriptive results indicate that most managers do not 
consider IFRS adoption or providing quarterly information to be beneficial for them. 
Table 3. Reporting Choices in Exchange-Regulated Markets 
Panel A: IFRS in Exchange-Regulated Markets 
IFRS Amsterdam Brussels Frankfurt Lisbon Paris Sum 
0 0 6 68 2 105 181 
1 1 2 24 0 18 45 
Sum 1 8 92 2 123 226 
 Panel B: Quarterly Reporting in Exchange-Regulated Markets 
Quarter Amsterdam Brussels Frankfurt Lisbon Paris Sum 
0 1 7 68 1 107 184 
1 0 1 24 1 16 42 
Sum 1 8 92 2 123 226 
IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) 
in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the 
company gives at least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financials. 
4.2 Research Design  
The research design is presented in Formula (1) and (2). The first model estimates a 
cross-sectional logistic regression where the dependent variable is coded one if the company 
voluntarily adopts IFRS in the year of the admission to the exchange-regulated market and 
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 zero otherwise. All models use robust standard errors and include industry, time (year), and 
listing (Entry Standard or Alternext) fixed effects (FE) when indicated. 
Cost and benefits of IFRS adoption might vary for firms listed in the exchange-
regulated markets compared to firms listed in EU-regulated markets because of the following 
differences: First, prior literature finds that larger firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt 
IFRS (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; Murphy, 1999; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Gassen 
and Sellhorn, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 2009), indicating that, for them, adoption is relatively less 
costly. Second, firms listed in exchange-regulated markets often operate in a domestic 
environment. If various stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, creditors, debitors, employees) are 
not internationally diversified, there might be less demand for IFRS. And third, ownership 
structure differs from large listed companies, which might influence the likelihood of firms 
voluntarily adopting IFRS.  
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(1) 
Firms listed in European exchange-regulated markets can voluntarily increase their 
level of transparency by following rules that are mostly required in EU-regulated markets (see 
Table 1). In particular, I examine an increase in the frequency of disclosure (from semi-annual 
to quarterly). Thus, the second model estimates a logistic regression where the dependent 
variable is coded one if the company voluntarily provided quarterly information after the 
admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the 
company gives at least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financials. 
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(2) 
Diversified investors might have different information needs than non-diversified 
investors. For them, IFRS might make it less costly to manage their portfolio and to decide 
between investment opportunities. This argument is in line with the finding of Florou and 
Pope (2012). They show that after mandatory IFRS adoption institutional ownership increases 
for adopters more than for non-adopters.  
Non-institutional investors are often under-diversified (e.g. Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008) and might benefit less from IFRS or quarterly reporting. Ernst et al. (2009) show that 
retail investors use financial statements differently than institutional investors. Retail investor 
often prefer filtered information like press news or analyst recommendation (Ernst et al., 
2009). The first independent variable (placement) is a proxy for diversified investors (in 
contrast to retail investors). Placement is coded one if a company offers their stocks to 
institutional investors prior to the listing. 
Firms located outside the country where they are listed (foreign) can choose to adopt 
IFRS or the respective local GAAP system. In line with prior research (Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005; Gassen and Sellhorn, 2006; Wu and Zhang, 
2009) I expect these firms to voluntarily adopt IFRS. Furthermore, foreign firms might have 
different incentives to provide voluntary disclosure. To further control for internationally 
oriented firms I include the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the 
company is located (fsales). 
Reporting choices may be correlated with the reputation of the auditor. Firms might 
enhance the reliability of financial reports by choosing an auditor with high reputation 
(Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). Furthermore, bigger audit firms might be more 
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 experienced with IFRS and capital market disclosure. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if 
the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors in the respective country and zero 
otherwise. In addition to the Big4 international auditing firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, and PWC), I consider BDO in Germany and Hazars in France to belong to the 
dominating auditing firms in the respective country. 
I expect reporting choices to be positively correlated with firm size. Providing 
disclosure incurs fixed costs and bigger firms are more likely to have prepared the data 
already for internal evaluation purposes. Further, implementing IFRS should be relatively less 
costly for bigger firms compared to smaller firms (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). 
When firms are financed through bank loans the borrower might be able to seek 
information directly from companies. Thus, highly leveraged firms might have different 
incentives for reporting than firms with a lower level of leverage. I include leverage, the ratio 
of non-equity to total assets.  
Firms with a more dispersed ownership structure after admission to the exchange-
regulated markets have different reporting incentives than closely held firms. They might 
benefit more from voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetries between managers 
and non-controlling owners. Newstocks is the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks.  
Return on asset (ROA) is included to control for profitability and calculated as 
Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by total asset at year-beginning. More 
profitable firms might have the resources to increase voluntary reporting. Furthermore, costly 
reporting can potentially be used as a signal to capital markets.    
Companies may voluntarily adopt IFRS and voluntarily provide quarterly financial 
information in anticipation of a future admission to a EU-regulated market. Thus, I include 
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 upgrade which is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated after the listing in the 
exchange-regulated market.  
4.3 Univariate Results 
Firms that decide to list in exchange-regulated markets have the choice to adopt IFRS 
and to voluntarily provide quarterly financial information. Table 4 gives the respective 
contingencies. Most firms (153) use local GAAP and do not provide quarterly information. 
Approximately 15% choose to either use IFRS or to report quarterly information. Only the 
minority of firms (6.2%) provide quarterly information and voluntary report quarterly 
financial information. 
Table 4. Contingency Table – Full Sample 
 
quarter=0 quarter=1 Sum 
IFRS = 0 153 28 181 
IFRS = 1 31 14 45 
Sum 184 42 226 
The table provides the contingencies of voluntary IFRS adoption and voluntary giving quarterly information. 
IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) 
in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the 
company gives at least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financials.  
Table 5 gives the summary statistics partitioned into non-adopters (IFRS = 0) and 
voluntary IFRS adopters (IFRS = 1). All financial statement variables are gathered from the 
last full annual (12 month) report prior to the admission. The results show that approximately 
65% of the voluntary IFRS adopters do not give any information about quarterly financial 
data.  
On average, voluntary IFRS adopters offer shares more often to institutional investors 
in form of private placements (placement). The difference is statistically significant (p-Value 
< 0.01). In line with prior literature, voluntary adopters are more often located in a country 
outside the country where they are listed (foreign). With the exception of two Chinese firms 
and one from British Virgin Island, all foreign firms are located in another EU member state.  
Voluntary adopters switch more often into a EU-regulated market (upgrade) and are 
bigger at the timing of the listing (size). These differences are statistically significant. All 
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 other variables are not statistically different between the two groups. Standard deviations of 
ROA and leverage are relatively large, presumably due to startup firms that tend to be very 
profitable or very unprofitable.  
Table 5. Summary Statistics – Full Sample 
IFRS = 0 N    Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
quarter 181 0.15 0.36      
placement 181 0.39 0.49      
foreign 181 0.02 0.15      
upgrade 181 0.03 0.16      
big5 181 0.29 0.46      
newstocks 181 0.29 0.25 0.00 0.15 0.26 0.38 2.12 
size 181 9.14 1.18 5.99 8.27 9.04 9.80 14.43 
ROA 181 -0.01 0.42 -3.08 0.00 0.04 0.12 1.02 
leverage 181 0.61 0.29 0.00 0.44 0.62 0.80 1.87 
fsales 181 0.23 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.45 1.00 
IFRS = 1 N    Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
quarter 45 0.31** 0.47      
placement 45 0.73*** 0.45      
foreign 45 0.22*** 0.42      
upgrade 45 0.13*** 0.34      
big5 45 0.29 0.46      
newstocks 45 0.34 0.42 0.00 0.12 0.23 0.35 2.35 
size 45 9.64** 1.21 7.11 9.06 9.67*** 10.46 12.41 
ROA 45 0.03 0.24 -0.84 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.44 
leverage 45 0.55 0.27 0.03 0.32 0.63 0.77 0.98 
fsales 45 0.28 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.56 1.00 
The table reports summary statistics partitioned by IFRS. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted 
the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated 
market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company gives at least some information (e.g. sales and 
earnings) about quarterly financials. Placement is coded one if the company offers stocks only to institutional 
investors prior to the listing. Foreign is coded one if the company is located in a country outside its listed 
exchange-regulated market. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated market at some 
point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is 
audited by one of the dominating auditors. Newstocks is the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-
equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company is 
located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level based on the two tailed t-test of the mean, the chi2 test 
of the mean of the dichotomous variables and the Wilcoxon rank test of the median. 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are given in Table 6. The proxy for diversified 
investors (placement) is highly correlated with voluntary IFRS adoption. Further, placement is 
weakly significantly correlated with giving quarterly information (quarter, p-Value <0.1).  
These results have to be interpreted with caution since upgrade is positively correlated 
with IFRS and quarter as well. This means that the results could be driven by firms that 
switch to a EU-regulated market. IFRS is positively correlated with foreign and size. In line 
with prior literature, bigger firms and foreign firms are more likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
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 Table 6. Pearson and Spearman Correlations – Full Sample 
    quarter foreign big5 size leverage 
 Variable IFRS placement upgrade newstocks ROA fsales 
IFRS 
 
0.16** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.20*** -0.00 0.07 0.17** 0.04 -0.09 0.07 
 quarter 0.16** 
 
0.13* 0.02 0.31*** -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.11* -0.17** 0.08 
 placement 0.27*** 0.13* 
 
0.24*** 0.12* -0.13* 0.18*** 0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 
 foreign 0.33*** 0.02 0.24*** 
 
0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.12* 
 upgrade 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.12* 0.03 
 
-0.01 0.11 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
 big5 0.00 -0.01 -0.12** -0.04 -0.01 
 
-0.02 0.03 -0.11* 0.04 0.14 
 newstocks -0.04 0.07 0.21*** -0.04 0.01 -0.05 
 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 
 size 0.19*** 0.12* 0.09 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12* 
 
0.21*** 0.07 0.10 
 ROA 0.03 0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.00 -0.11* -0.11 -0.08 
 
-0.13* 0.07 
 leverage -0.06 -0.16** -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.15** -0.14** 
 
-0.08 
 fsales 0.03 0.12* -0.02 0.10 -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.10 
  The table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the 
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company 
gives at least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financials. Placement is coded one if the company offers stocks only to institutional investors prior to 
the listing. Foreign is coded one if the company is located in a country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-
regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating 
auditors. Newstocks is the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is 
the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company is located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level. 
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 5. Multivariate Results  
5.1 Voluntary IFRS Adoption 
5.1.1 Determinants Model 
  The multivariate results are displayed in Table 7. The only difference between Model 
1 and Model 2 is that upgrade is included as a control variable in Model 1. The reason for two 
different models is that a future upgrade to a EU-regulated market is only observable if the 
admission to the exchange-regulated market was not recent and the firm had time to upgrade. 
Furthermore, a future upgrade might be correlated with other control variables. Although 
upgrade has a significant influence on the probability to adopt IFRS, all other results remain 
relatively constant. The models show that the probability of adopting IFRS is positively 
related to private placement (placement), foreign listings (foreign), size and a future upgrade 
to a EU-regulated market. In unreported results I include the interaction of upgrade and 
placement in Model 2. The results stay qualitatively the same and the coefficient of the 
interaction term does not show statistical significance.  
5.1.2 Underwriting 
Firms that list their shares for the first time hire an underwriter to conduct the listing. 
Thus, another determinant of voluntary IFRS adoption might be that it is the underwriter who 
decides upon the accounting regime. I do not find any systematic pattern among the 
underwriters to choose a specific GAAP system. In general, incentives of the underwriter and 
the firm typically align since underwriters charge commissions depending on the success of 
the listing. In total, firms of the sample use 69 different underwriters. The multivariate 
regressions do not include fixed effects for different underwriters as this would reduce the 
degrees of freedom significantly. 
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 Table 7. Voluntary IFRS Adoption – Full Sample 
   Model 1   Model 2 
Dependent variable:      IFRS     IFRS 
placement 1.328*** 1.347*** 
  (0.472) (0.467) 
foreign 2.416*** 2.279*** 
  (0.841) (0.806) 
big5 0.255 0.271 
  (0.456) (0.474) 
newstocks 0.570 0.449 
  (0.524) (0.611) 
size 0.368* 0.436* 
  (0.211) (0.228) 
ROA 0.539 0.407 
  (0.564) (0.605) 
leverage -0.899 -0.868 
  (0.779) (0.722) 
fsales -0.225 -0.104 
  (0.689) (0.681) 
upgrade  2.394*** 
  (0.735) 
Listing FE     Yes     Yes 
Industry FE     Yes     Yes 
Time FE     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes 
LR 0.004 0.005 
R-squared 0.261 0.300 
N       226       226 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of voluntary adoption of IFRS at the admission to the 
exchange-regulated market. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the International Financial 
Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of the admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. 
Placement is coded one if the company offers stocks only to institutional investors prior to the listing. Foreign is 
coded one if the company is located in a country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy 
variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors. Newstocks is the ratio of newly 
issued stocks to existing stocks. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside 
the country where the company is located. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated 
market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Robust standard errors are provided 
within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
5.1.3 Upgrade to a EU-Regulated Market 
Companies might use exchange-regulated markets as a first step to upgrade into EU-
regulated markets. Those firms might have the incentive to voluntarily adopt IFRS right from 
the beginning since firms in EU-regulated markets are required to use IFRS. Thus, the 
incentive structure of those firms is different from those that are not planning to upgrade. The 
models used so far include a dummy which is one if the respective companies choose to 
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 upgrade at some point in time. As stated earlier, this is only observable if the listing in the 
exchange-regulated market was not recent. Almost all upgrading firms of the sample (except 
for two) listed in the exchange-regulated markets between 2005 and 2007. Of those, all but 
one upgraded within three years. Thus, I assume that if I restrict the sample to the years 2005 
– 2007, firms that wanted to upgrade had the time to do so. Table 8 gives the results of the 
sample of firms which listed for the first time on the exchange-regulated markets between 
2005 and 2007. The sample excludes firms that upgrade to a EU-regulated market. The results 
stay qualitatively the same. One limitation of this analysis is that it only controls for actual 
upgrades in EU-regulated markets, not expected upgrades. It might be that firms adopt IFRS 
in anticipation of a future upgrade but then do not upgrade due to unexpected performance or 
unexpected decline in growth.  
5.1.4 Label Adopters 
Daske et al. (2013) divide their sample of voluntary IFRS adopters in “label adopters” 
and “serious adopters” and find that positive capital market consequences (increases in 
liquidity and decreases in cost of capital) only occur among those companies that have an 
incentive to change their reporting behavior (serious adopters). The authors use, among 
others, a classification scheme based on reporting incentives. They argue that serious adopters 
are larger, more profitable, have larger financing needs, larger growth opportunities, more 
dispersed ownership, and stronger incentives for transparent information.  
One could argue that firms of the exchange-regulated markets should be serious 
adopters since they voluntarily adopt IFRS. Hence, benefits of adoption should outweigh 
costs. Contrary, it might be that firms voluntarily adopt IFRS because they are required by 
e.g. equity or debt providers. In this case, they might just adopt the label of IFRS reporting 
without really applying the rules. Thus, these firms can be label adopters.  
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 Table 8. Voluntary IFRS Adoption, 2005 - 2007  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable:  IFRS quarter 
placement 1.889*** 0.447 
  (0.633) (0.639) 
foreign 4.720*** -1.382 
  (1.041) (0.911) 
big5 0.374 0.473 
  (0.654) (0.598) 
newstocks -4.296** 1.128 
  (2.062) (1.085) 
size 0.439 0.515** 
  (0.347) (0.252) 
ROA 2.776 1.435 
  (2.225) (1.244) 
leverage 2.149 -2.859** 
  (1.346) (1.121) 
fsales -0.879 1.014 
  (1.346) (0.828) 
Listing FE      Yes      Yes 
Industry FE      Yes      Yes 
Time FE      Yes      Yes 
Constant      Yes      Yes 
LR 0.0001 0.0224 
R-squared 0.3616 0.2058 
N       157       157 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of the voluntary adoption of IFRS and voluntary 
issuance of quarterly and corporate governance information at the admission the exchange-regulated market. The 
sample is restricted to listings between 2005 and 2007. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the 
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated 
market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company gives at least some information (e.g. sales and 
earnings) about quarterly financial data. Institutional is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to 
institutional investors. Retail is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to retail investors. Instown is 
the percentage of ownership from institutional investors. Foreign is coded one if the company is located in a 
country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is 
audited by one of the dominating. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return 
on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized 
outside the country where the company is located. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-
regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Robust standard errors are 
provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
My tests are not designed to make any inference in this respect. The only surprising 
result is the low frequency of Big5 auditing firms among the IFRS adopters (29%). According 
to Daske et al. (2013) serious adopters have incentives for transparent information, so that 
(serious) voluntary adopters should choose auditors that provide high quality audits. Big5 
auditors often serve as a proxy for audit quality, especially since Big5 auditors are more 
experienced with IFRS. 
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 5.1.5 Anticipation of Future Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Another incentive to adopt IFRS might be the anticipation of a future requirement to 
use IFRS in exchange-regulated markets. This would cause cross-sectional differences in 
adopting behavior if some firms still list after IFRS is mandatory and some firms delist from 
the capital markets. To the best of my knowledge, there is no discussion of respective stock 
exchanges to change their rules regarding the use of IFRS. Instead, they point out that the 
choice about the accounting regime is an advantage compared to the EU-regulated market. 
Furthermore, I could not find any evidence that the European Commission wants to change 
the rules for exchange-regulated markets. The only current discussion is about extending 
IFRS to small and medium sized private companies (IFRS for SMEs). In this case, all firms 
are affected by the regulation and there should be no (or at least fewer) cross-sectional 
differences.   
5.1.6 Influence of a Parent Company 
The models do not include a variable that captures whether listed firms are part of a 
group. I observe the ownership structure prior to the admission to the exchange-regulated 
markets and can rule out that sample firms are subsidiaries within a group. Hence, there are 
no incentives stemming from a parent company to voluntary adopt IFRS or to voluntary 
provide quarterly information.  
5.2 Voluntary Quarterly Disclosures 
Table 9 uses quarter as dependent variable instead of IFRS. The models estimate the 
likelihood of issuing quarterly information. As before, the models differ with respect to the 
upgrade variable. The table shows that firms that upgrade into the EU-regulated markets are 
more likely to voluntarily give quarterly financial information. Also, the models show that 
placement is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable.  
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 The only other coefficient that shows statistical significance is leverage. Firms with a 
higher leverage ratio are less likely to publish quarterly information. This finding could be 
explained by relationships to banks. Especially smaller private firms in Europe (before the 
IPO) are often financed through one bank (Peek et al., 2010). This bank might be able to seek 
information directly from the company and is thus not dependent on voluntary disclosure. 
Table 9. Quarterly Reporting – Full Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable:  quarter quarter 
placement 0.551 0.291 
  (0.421) (0.459) 
foreign -0.041 -0.309 
  (0.991) (0.853) 
big5 0.354 0.361 
  (0.461) (0.489) 
newstocks -0.458 -0.912 
  (0.628) (1.520) 
size 0.267 0.281 
  (0.173) (0.183) 
ROA 1.019 1.089 
  (0.699) (0.790) 
leverage -2.299*** -2.442*** 
  (0.781) (0.904) 
fsales 0.571 0.912 
  (0.606) (0.611) 
upgrade  3.776*** 
  (1.126) 
Listing FE     Yes     Yes 
Industry FE     Yes     Yes 
Time FE     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes 
LR 0.086 0.001 
R-squared 0.152 0.232 
N       226       226 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of voluntary issuance of quarterly information after the 
admission to the exchange-regulated market. Quarter is coded one if the company gives at least some 
information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financial data. Placement is coded one if the company 
offers stocks only to institutional investors prior to the listing. Foreign is coded one if the company is located in 
a country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is 
audited by one of the dominating auditors. Newstocks is the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-
equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company is 
located. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after the listing 
in the exchange-regulated market. Robust standard errors are provided within the brackets below the 
coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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 6. Discussion of Results  
6.1 Comparability vs. Transparency Arguments 
Table 7 and Table 9 show that the proxy for diversified investors (placement) is 
positively related to voluntary IFRS adoption but not to voluntary quarterly reporting. This 
section discusses the different results with respect to diversified investors.  
In Table 10 quarter is included as independent variable into the models where IFRS is 
the dependent variable and vice versa. Further, interactions of these variables with placement 
are included. The interaction term in Model 1 should be positively significant if firms that 
perform a private placement and publish voluntary quarterly information are more likely to 
adopt IFRS voluntarily. Neither quarter nor the interaction term shows statistical significance. 
This indicates that the positive relationship between placement and voluntary IFRS adoption 
is unconditional on the decision to report quarterly.   
Model 2 shows that IFRS is weakly associated with quarter. Neither placement nor the 
interaction of placement and IFRS show statistical significance. These results indicate that 
private placements do not influence the decision to engage in voluntary quarterly reporting.   
The findings of Table 7, Table 9 and Table 10 can be interpreted along the following 
lines: Institutional investors demand IFRS adoption, but do not demand quarterly reporting. A 
possible explanation for the different incentives could be the relative importance of 
comparability and transparency.  
I consider financial statements to be comparable if the underlying accounting systems 
capture economic events in the same way. This implies that when a company switches from 
GAAP system ‘A’ to GAAP system ‘B’, financial statements are now more comparable to 
financial statements of firms using system ‘B’, but less comparable to firms using system ‘A’. 
It implies that investors who are used to system ‘B’ no longer have to reconcile financial data. 
Thus, the switch to GAAP system ‘B’ makes it less costly for these investors to manage their 
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 portfolio. Therefore, a switch to another accounting regime decreases costs for one group of 
investors, but increases the costs for another. The underlying assumption is that investors are 
able to reconcile information between GAAP systems.  
Table 10. Interaction Models – Full Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable:  IFRS quarter 
placement 1.389** 0.336 
  (0.566) (0.551) 
quarter 0.972 
   (0.914) 
 placement*quarter -0.517 
   (1.059) 
 IFRS 
 
1.403* 
  
 
(0.761) 
placement*IFRS 
 
-1.119 
  
 
(1.038) 
Controls     Yes     Yes 
Listing FE     Yes     Yes 
Industry FE     Yes     Yes 
Time FE     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes 
LR 0.009 0.001 
R-squared 0.306 0.244 
N       226       226 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of regressions of the voluntary adoption of IFRS and 
voluntary issuance of quarterly at the admission to the exchange-regulated market. IFRS is coded one if the 
company voluntarily adopted the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of the 
admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company gives at 
least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financial data. Placement is coded one if the 
company offers stocks only to institutional investors prior to the listing. Robust standard errors are provided 
within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
On the one hand, firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS are likely more comparable to 
all firms from the major European EU-regulated stock markets since they now use the same 
set of rules. This applies to firms of the national EU-regulated stock market (within a country) 
and other EU-regulated stock markets (cross-country). Thus, I consider the voluntary switch 
of firms listed in European exchange-regulated markets to IFRS after 2005 to be an increase 
in comparability. 
On the other hand, these firms become less comparable to their peers from the 
exchange-regulated markets (if the majority of them sticks to local GAAP). Since the market 
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 value of the major markets exceeds the market value of the exchange-regulated markets 
multiple times, I consider a switch to IFRS as an increase in comparability.  
Evidence of the first order effects, comparability and transparency, is mixed 
(Brüggemann et al. 2013). In a cross-country study, Yip and Young (2012) provide evidence 
that information comparability increases within Europe. Cascino and Gassen (2014) find only 
a limited comparability effect of mandatory IFRS adoption within industries across countries. 
The authors explain difference in comparability by firm-level heterogeneity in IFRS 
compliance and cross-country differences in enforcement.  
Institutional investors are often well diversified and benefit (more) from standardized 
information about their investments (in contrast to under-diversified retail investors, e.g. 
Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Ball (2006) argues that the benefits of IFRS “would be 
greatest for institutions that create large, standardized format financial databases”. Thus, 
diversified investors might prefer IFRS since the adoption could potentially reduce the costs 
of managing their diversified portfolio.  
For non-diversified investors comparability might be important when they want to sell 
or buy stocks. Surveys find that retail investors often do not use data from financial reports 
and instead use filtered information by financial intermediaries like press news (e.g. Ernst et 
al., 2009). Thus, individual investors benefit less from comparability compared to institutional 
investors.  
A possible explanation why the proxy of diversified investors is not related to 
quarterly reporting (Table 9) might be that institutional investors prefer opaque financial 
reporting because they benefit from acquiring private information (Maffett, 2012). Hence, 
institutional investors might not demand more information than retail investors. I understand 
transparency as the ability of financial reporting to reveal the underlying economics of a firm. 
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 An increase in transparency is either increasing the quality (reliability), the quantity or the 
frequency of value relevant information. 
6.2 Length of Financial Statements 
The previous subsection revealed that proxies for diversified investors are related to 
IFRS adoption, but not related to the decision to voluntarily disclose quarterly financials. 
Furthermore, statistics of Table 4 show that the majority of voluntary IFRS adopters do not 
voluntarily provide quarterly financial information. This raises the question whether the 
adoption of IFRS in the exchange-regulated markets increases transparency.  
This subsection investigates the level of disclosure within the annual financial 
statements, measured as the number of words. I conduct this analysis only within the Entry 
Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The reason for this is that all German firms have 
to publish their annual statements online with the German Federal Gazette. The advantage is 
that, usually, the annual statement is to some degree standardized and does not contain non-
GAAP parts such as environmental or social disclosures.  
Furthermore, annual reports from the Alternext sample are not always available. I 
restrict the sample to firms that are not small according the German Commercial Code since 
small firms have lower disclosure requirements (e.g. they are not required to report a profit 
and loss statement).1  
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 11. The mean of the length of the financial 
statement, measured as the number of words deflated by total assets (words), is statistically 
different between the two groups, but the median is not. Measured as the natural logarithm 
(ln_words) both the mean and the median are statistically higher among the IFRS adopters.  
  
1 Firm are considered to be not small if they exceed two of following thresholds in two consecutive years: (1) 
4,840,000 Euro total assets, (2) 9,680,000 Euro sales and (3) 50 employees (§ 267 (1) HGB). 
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 Table 11. Summary Statistics – Entry Standard Sample 
IFRS = 0 N    Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
placement 57 0.61 0.49      
upgrade 57 0.05 0.23      
big5 57 0.18 0.38      
words 57 0.93 1.00 0.06 0.34 0.59 1.27 4.58 
ln_words 57 8.79 0.66 7.05 8.41 8.90 9.22 9.97 
newstocks 57 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.41 0.85 
size 57 9.33 1.20 7.04 8.43 9.36 10.37 11.46 
ROA 57 0.03 0.17 -0.78 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.45 
leverage 57 0.59 0.32 0.01 0.41 0.65 0.78 1.52 
fsales 57 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.91 
IFRS = 1 N    Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
placement 19 0.89** 0.32      
upgrade 19 0.21** 0.42      
big5 19 0.05 0.23      
words 19 2.12** 3.38 0.02 0.35 0.68 1.50 11.75 
ln_words 19 9.31*** 0.66 7.53 9.04 9.51*** 9.73 10.05 
newstocks 19 0.46** 0.59 0.00 0.16 0.25 0.48 2.35 
size 19 9.50 1.18 7.31 9.13 9.57 10.38 11.24 
ROA 19 0.04 0.24 -0.84 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.44 
leverage 19 0.55 0.30 0.03 0.23 0.65 0.77 0.98 
fsales 19 0.23 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 1.00 
The table reports summary statistics partitioned by IFRS. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted 
the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated 
market and zero otherwise. Placement is coded one if the company offers stocks only to institutional investors 
prior to the listing. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after 
the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by 
one of the dominating auditors. Words is number of words of the annual financial statement deflated by total 
assets. Ln_words is the natural logarithm of the number of words of the annual financial statement. Newstocks is 
the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand 
Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of 
sales that is realized outside the country where the company is located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level based on the two tailed t-test of the mean, the chi2 test of the mean of the dichotomous variables 
and the Wilcoxon rank test of the median. 
The correlations of Table 12 show that the number of words is positively correlated 
with voluntary IFRS adoption, the proxy for diversified investors (placement) and the size of 
the company.  
The multivariate results of Table 13 are generally consistent with the results of Table 
9. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the number of words deflated by total assets and the 
dependent variable in Model 2 is the natural logarithm of the number of words. The 
coefficient of IFRS shows no significance in the first model and only a weak correlation (p-
Value < 0.10) with the dependent variable in Model 2. It should be mentioned that the number 
of words is counted in the first IFRS annual statement. Hence, the results could be upwards 
biased due to first time adoption effects. Although IFRS requires additional disclosure 
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 requirements compared to local GAAP, I cannot provide evidence that IFRS adoption is 
influencing the length of the annual financial statements.  
These results should be interpreted with caution because of the endogenous choice of 
IFRS adoption. The results are only valid within the sample and, due to self selection, 
findings should not be generalized. 
Furthermore, this analysis is based on the level of number of words and not on 
changes. Changes are difficult to obtain since annual statements prior to the admission to the 
exchange-regulated markets are often not available. To draw further conclusions about 
whether voluntary IFRS adopters do provide more transparency compared to local GAAP or 
not, further analyses with different proxies and different identification strategies are 
necessary.  
One possible explanation for the findings could be that an increase in transparency is 
not the primary objective of firms to adopt IFRS. Rather they might adopt IFRS to use the 
same set of rules as firms of the EU-regulated markets; potentially increasing comparability 
with these firms.  
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 Table 12. Pearson and Spearman Correlations – Entry Standard Sample 
  IFRS   upgrade words  newstocks  ROA  fsales 
Variable  placement big5  ln_words  size  leverage   
IFRS  0.26** 0.24** -0.15 0.26** 0.32*** 0.25** 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0.07  
placement 0.26**  0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.21* 0.38*** 0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.15  
upgrade 0.24** 0.02  0.13 -0.01 -0.17 0.20* -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.01  
big5 -0.15 -0.04 0.12  -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.09 -0.26**  
words 0.10 0.04 0.09 -0.09  0.21* 0.22** -0.59*** -0.33*** 0.06 -0.05  
ln_words 0.39*** 0.29** -0.17 0.00 0.15  -0.03 0.39*** 0.08 0.22* -0.04  
newstocks 0.06 0.52*** 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.05  0.04 -0.34*** -0.09 -0.03  
size 0.06 0.10 -0.08 0.12 -0.83*** 0.33*** -0.02  0.21* 0.10 -0.15  
ROA 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.10 0.02  -0.14 0.16  
leverage -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.05 0.12 0.11 0.15 -0.15  -0.05  
fsales -0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.21* 0.11 -0.09 0.14 -0.14 0.17 -0.09   
The table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the International 
Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a 
EU-regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating 
auditors. Words is number of words of the annual financial statement deflated by total assets. Ln_words is the natural logarithm of the number of words of the annual financial 
statement. Institutional is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to institutional investors. Retail is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to retail 
investors. Instown is the percentage of ownership from institutional investors. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is 
the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company is located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level 
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 Table 13. Number of Words – Entry Standard Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable:  words ln_words 
placement -0.254 0.183 
  (0.435) (0.184) 
IFRS 1.038 0.681* 
 
(0.746) (0.371) 
placement*IFRS -0.126 -0.208 
  (0.976) (0.382) 
big5 0.348 0.241 
  (0.456) (0.181) 
newstocks 0.707 -0.142 
  (1.244) (0.354) 
size 
 
0.161** 
  
 
(0.074) 
ROA -2.731 -0.081 
  (1.735) (0.415) 
leverage 0.080 0.464* 
  (0.683) (0.249) 
fsales -0.474 0.026 
  (0.725) (0.261) 
upgrade -0.663 -0.371 
 (0.777) (0.250) 
Listing FE     Yes     Yes 
Industry FE     Yes     Yes 
Time FE     Yes     Yes 
Constant     Yes     Yes 
R-squared 0.462 0.466 
N         76         76 
The table provides the results of the OLS regressions of the number of words in the first financial statements 
after the admission to the exchange-regulated markets. Words is number of words of the annual financial 
statement deflated by total assets. Ln_words is the natural logarithm of the number of words of the respective 
financial statements. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the International Financial 
Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero 
otherwise. Placement is coded one if the company offers stocks only to institutional investors prior to the listing. 
Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors. Newstocks is 
the ratio of newly issued stocks to existing stocks. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand 
Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of 
sales that is realized outside the country where the company is located. Upgrade is coded one if the company 
switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Robust 
standard errors are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level. 
6.3 Disclosure Compliance 
Furthermore, I examine the disclosure compliance of voluntary IFRS adopters. If these 
firms seriously adopt IFRS, they should have high compliance. The compliance score is based 
on Cascino and Gassen (2014). I focus only on those parts of the financial statements where 
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 the majority of firms have to make disclosures. In particular, I look at IAS 33 (Earnings per 
Share), IAS 38 (Intangible Assets) and IAS 39 (Financial Instruments).  
I find that compliance is generally low and worse compared to the German mandatory 
IFRS adopters of Cascino and Gassen (2014). Especially disclosure of intangible assets 
(42.7%, Cascino and Gassen: 87.7%), and financial instruments (39.3%, Cascino and Gassen: 
46.0%) are very low. This is surprising since voluntary adopters should have higher incentives 
to comply with the rules than mandatory adopters.  
6.4 Exit Strategies 
Another explanation for the finding that placement is positively related to IFRS but not 
to quarter could be different exit strategies of institutional investors compared to non-
institutional investors. Non-institutional owners are often family owners which hold a 
significant amount of shares (Anderson et al., 2003). Family owners have a longer investment 
horizon and thus represent under-diversified block-holders that do not (or rarely) trade their 
shares.  
Institutional investors have usually different exit strategies: They can sell their stock 
on the public market or the respective firm becomes an M&A target. In the latter case, it 
might be beneficial for the institutional investors to require firms to use IFRS because the 
consolidation with a potential buyer, which uses the same accounting system, could be 
relatively less costly. Thus, the adoption of IFRS might increase the likelihood of a future 
acquisition of the firm.  
7. Robustness Tests - NYSE Alternext Sample 
The analyses above separate the sample into firms that sell stocks prior to the listing to 
institutional investors and those that do not. This does not take into account that even within 
the IPO, stocks are sold to institutional investors and to retail investors.  
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 The NYSE Alternext firms provide information about the number of shares that are 
offered directly to institutional investors within a “global placement” procedure and the 
number of shares offered to retail investors. Thus, firms from the NYSE Alternext markets 
(Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and Paris) provide a cleaner setting to investigate incentives 
stemming from diversified investors. The following analyses include the variables 
institutional and retail, the natural logarithms of the values of stocks offered to institutional 
investors and retail investors, respectively. Stock value is evaluated at the IPO price. 
Furthermore, the Alternext subsample includes the second proxy for demand of 
institutional owners, the proportion of institutional ownership (instowns) prior to admission. 
This variable must not be confused with the share of block-holders. It rather captures the 
proportion of all institutional owners. If institutional owners are themselves owned by board 
members and/or their family members, the shares are assigned to private ownership. 
Furthermore, the models control for the value of shares offered by a capital increase 
(capincrease) and shares offered by existing shareholders (disposal). Unfortunately, this 
information is not given for all firms of the Entry Standard. Thus, detailed information on the 
ownership structure prior to admission and changes in the ownership structure are only 
available in the Alternext subsample. The following models are estimated only within the 
sample of firms listed in the exchange-regulated markets of Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, and 
Paris (Alternext). 
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Table 14 shows summary statistics for the reduced sample of these firms partitioned 
by IFRS. The value of stocks offered to institutional investors (institutional) is higher for 
IFRS adopters and the value of stocks offered to retail investors (retail) is less. Both 
differences are statistically significant. The proportion of institutional ownership prior to the 
listing is higher within the IFRS adoption sample.  
Table 14. Summary Statistics – Alternext Sample 
IFRSt = 0 N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
quarter 113 0.11 0.31      
foreign 113 0.03 0.16      
upgrade 113 0.01 0.09      
big5 113 0.36 0.48      
institutional 113 14.82 3.59 0.00 15.02 15.50 16.11 17.12 
retail 113 10.60 6.15 0.00 12.49 13.67 14.46 16.37 
instown 113 0.38 0.34 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.62 1.00 
size 113 9.09 1.13 6.24 8.35 8.99 9.64 14.43 
ROA 113 -0.01 0.42 -2.47 0.01 0.04 0.14 1.02 
leverage 113 0.62 0.28 0.00 0.46 0.62 0.80 1.87 
fsales 113 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.49 1.00 
IFRSt = 1 N Mean Sd Min P25 Median P75 Max 
quarter 21 0.29** 0.46 
     foreign 21 0.33*** 0.48 
     upgrade 21 0.10*** 0.30 
     big5 21 0.52 0.51 
institutional 21 16.13* 0.77 15.41 15.52 15.87*** 16.52 18.20 
retail 21 5.44*** 7.13 0.00 0.00 0.00** 13.88 15.84 
instown 21 0.56** 0.43 0.00 0.17 0.75* 0.98 1.00 
size 21 9.69** 1.33 7.11 9.00 9.67** 10.49 12.41 
ROA 21 -0.02 0.25 -0.62 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.27 
leverage 21 0.58 0.23 0.06 0.39 0.65 0.77 0.95 
fsales 21 0.28 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.50 0.90 
The table reports the summary statistics of the Alternext sample partitioned by IFRS. IFRS is coded one if the 
company voluntarily adopted the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their 
admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company gives at 
least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financial data. Foreign is coded one if the 
company is located in a country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Upgrade is coded one if the 
company switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. 
Big5 is a dummy variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors. Institutional is 
the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to institutional investors. Retail is the natural logarithm of the 
value of stocks offered to retail investors. Instown is the percentage of ownership from institutional investors. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of 
non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company 
is located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level based on the two tailed t-test of the mean, the chi2 
test of the mean of the dichotomous variables and the Wilcoxon rank test of the median. 
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 The correlations of Table 15 show that IFRS is positively correlated with quarter, 
foreign, upgrade, institutional, instown and size. This provides univariate evidence that firms 
offering new shares to institutional investors and firms owned by institutional investors prior 
to the admission are more likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. These firms’ characteristics are 
not correlated with the issuance of quarterly financial information. Furthermore, firms that 
offer shares to non-institutional investors (retail) are less likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS.  
The multivariate logistic regression in Table 16 supports the results of Table 7 and 
Table 9. The natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to institutional investors 
(institutional) is positively significantly linked to the probability of voluntarily adopting 
IFRS. Furthermore, the percentage of institutional ownership prior to the admission (instown) 
is positively significant as well. Firms that are owned by institutional investors are more likely 
to voluntarily adopt IFRS. These firm characteristics do not have a significant influence on 
the issuance of quarterly reporting (Model 2). In addition, foreign listed firms are more likely 
to voluntarily adopt IFRS, but are not more likely to issue quarterly information (quarter). 
Overall, the results of the Alternext sample confirm prior results.  
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Table 15. Pearson and Spearman Correlations – Alternext Sample 
    quarter upgrade institutional instown ROA fsales 
Variable IFRS foreign big5 retail size leverage 
 IFRS 
 
0.19** 0.42*** 0.21** 0.12 0.14* -0.29*** 0.18** 0.18** -0.01 -0.05 0.04 
 quarter 0.19** 
 
0.05 0.24*** 0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08 -0.17** -0.03 
 foreign 0.42*** 0.05 
 
0.15* -0.05 0.04 -0.37*** -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.10 
 upgrade 0.21** 0.24*** 0.15* 
 
-0.02 0.06 -0.12 0.10 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 big5 0.12 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 
 
0.12 -0.01 0.23*** -0.03 -0.15* 0.08 0.21** 
 institutional 0.24*** 0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.14 
 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 
 retail -0.22** -0.10 -0.31*** -0.14 -0.02 0.21** 
 
-0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
 instown 0.15* 0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.25*** 0.04 -0.05 
 
-0.02 -0.20** -0.08 0.07 
 size 0.19** 0.12 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.27*** 0.02 -0.02 
 
0.22** 0.10 0.16* 
 ROA -0.07 0.06 0.11 0.03 -0.14 -0.10 -0.03 -0.30*** -0.21** 
 
-0.17* 0.03 
 leverage -0.03 -0.15* 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.21** -0.10 
 
-0.08 
 fsales 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.18** 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.15* 0.02 -0.10 
  The table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. IFRS is coded one if the company voluntarily adopted the 
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Quarter is coded one if the company 
gives at least some information (e.g. sales and earnings) about quarterly financial data. Foreign is coded one if the company is located in a country outside its listed exchange-
regulated market. Upgrade is coded one if the company switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy 
variable coded one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors. Institutional is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to institutional investors. 
Retail is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to retail investors. Instown is the percentage of ownership from institutional investors. Size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets (in thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the proportion of sales that is realized outside the 
country where the company is located. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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 Table 16. Reporting Choices – Alternext Sample   
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent variable:  IFRS quarter 
institutional 1.651* 0.034 
  (0.988) (0.086) 
retail -0.088 -0.026 
  (0.071) (0.042) 
instown 3.835** -0.492 
  (1.555) (0.709) 
foreign 5.436*** 0.359 
  (1.831) (0.785) 
big5 1.798 1.084* 
  (1.243) (0.603) 
size 1.542** 0.468* 
  (0.695) (0.224) 
ROA 1.266 0.348 
  (1.665) (0.996) 
leverage -2.549** -3.561** 
  (1.027) (1.495) 
fsales -1.088 -0.498 
  (1.151) (0.953) 
upgrade  6.166** 4.368** 
   (1.816) (1.933) 
Listing FE       Yes      Yes 
Industry FE      Yes      Yes 
Time FE      Yes      Yes 
Constant      Yes      Yes 
LR 0.001 0.151 
R-squared 0.555 0.219 
N       134       134 
The table provides the results of the logistic regressions of the voluntary adoption of IFRS and voluntary 
issuance of quarterly information at the admission the exchange-regulated market. IFRS is coded one if the 
company voluntarily adopted the International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the year of their 
admission to the exchange-regulated market and zero otherwise. Institutional is the natural logarithm of the 
value of stocks offered to institutional investors. Retail is the natural logarithm of the value of stocks offered to 
retail investors. Instown is the percentage of ownership from institutional investors. Foreign is coded one if the 
company is located in a country outside its listed exchange-regulated market. Big5 is a dummy variable coded 
one if the company is audited by one of the dominating auditors. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (in 
thousand Euros). ROA is return on assets. Leverage is the ratio of non-equity to total assets. Fsales is the 
proportion of sales that is realized outside the country where the company is located. Upgrade is coded one if the 
company switched to a EU-regulated market at some point after the listing in the exchange-regulated market. 
Robust standard errors are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at 
the 1/5/10% level. 
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 8. Conclusion 
This paper investigates reporting choices of firms listed in European exchange-
regulated markets. In particular, it sheds light on the decisions to voluntarily adopt IFRS and 
to voluntarily increase quarterly reporting in the European exchange-regulated markets of 
Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, Lisbon, and Paris.  
I find that firms rarely use IFRS and rarely provide quarterly information. 
Furthermore, even IFRS adopters mostly do not provide quarterly financial information. 
Determinants models show that the proxies for diversified investors are positively related to 
voluntary IFRS adoption but not to voluntary quarterly information disclosure or the length of 
the annual statements. One possible explanation might be that firms primarily adopt IFRS in 
exchange-regulated markets to use the same set of rules as firms listed in EU-regulated 
markets. IFRS adoption could be driven by diversified investors who benefit more from the 
same set of rules compared to non-diversified investors.  
Until today, there is still no clear understanding why firms adopt IFRS and what the 
economic consequences are. In this study, I could not find evidence that voluntary IFRS 
adopters provide more information compared to local GAAP firms: They rarely provide 
quarterly information, their compliance is surprisingly low and the length of the financial 
statements is, when controlled for size effects, not significantly more. Taken together this 
could indicate that some firms just adopt the label IFRS, but do not really change their 
reporting behavior.   
  
 126 
 References 
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., Reeb, D. M., 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency 
cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2), 263–285. 
Andre, P, Walton, P., Yan, D., 2012. Voluntary adoption of IFRS: A study of determinants for 
UK unlisted firms. ESSEC Business School. Working Paper.  
Ball, R., 2006. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Pros and cons for 
investors. Accounting and Business Research 36 (1), 5–27. 
Bassemir, M., 2012. Why do private firms adopt IFRS? Working Paper, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1896283 (accessed: 05/02/2013). 
Bhojraj, S, Libby, R., 2005. Capital market pressure, disclosure, frequency-induced 
earnings/cash flow conflict, and managerial myopia. The Accounting Review 80 (1), 1–
20. 
Botosan, C. A., Harris, M. S., 2000. Motivations for a change in disclosure frequency: An 
examination of voluntary segment disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (2), 
329–353.  
Brüggemann, U., Hitz, J.-M., Sellhorn, T., 2013. Intended and unintended consequences of 
mandatory IFRS adoption: A review of extant evidence and suggestions for future 
research. European Accounting Review 22 (1), 1–37. 
Butler, M., Kraft, A., Weiss, I. S., 2007. The effect of reporting frequency on the timeliness of 
earnings: The cases of voluntary and mandatory interim reports. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 43 (2–3), 181–217. 
Cascino, S., Gassen, J., 2014. What drives the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption? Review of Accounting Studies. Forthcoming.  
Cuijpers, R., Buijink, W., 2005. Voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP in the European 
Union: A study of determinants and consequences. European Accounting Review 14 (3), 
487–524. 
 127 
 Daske, H., Hail, L., Verdi, R., 2013. Adopting a label: Heterogeneity in the economic 
consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (3), 495–
547. 
Deutsches Aktieninstitut, 2010. DAI – Kurzstudie: Fünf Jahre Entry Standard: Emittenten 
zufrieden.  
Dumontier, P., Raffournier, B., 1998. Why firms comply voluntarily with IAS: An empirical 
analysis with Swiss data. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 
9 (3), 215–245.  
European Commission, 2003. Directive 2003/71/EC of the the European Parliament and of 
the council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
European Commission, 2002. Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards. 
European Commission, 1993. Council Directive 93/22/ECC of 10 May 1993 on investment 
services in the securities field.  
Ernst, E., Gassen, J, Pellens, B., 2009. Verhalten und Präferenzen deutscher Aktionäre: Eine 
Befragung von privaten und institutionellen Anlegern zum Informationsverhalten, zur 
Dividendenpräferenz und zur Wahrnehmung von Stimmrechten [Information Needs, 
Dividend Preferences and Voting Behavior of German Investors: Results of a Large-
Scale Survey]. Studien des Deutschen Aktieninstituts, Heft 42, Frankfurt am Main. 
Ernstberger, J., Link, B., Vogler, O., 2011. The real effects of quarterly reporting. Working 
Paper.  
Florou, A., Pope P., 2012. Mandatory IFRS adoption and institutional investment decisions. 
The Accounting Review 87 (6), 1993–2025.  
Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K., Martin, X., Pereira, R., 2008. The role of firm-specific 
incentives and country factors in explaining voluntary IAS adoptions: Evidence from 
private Firms. European Accounting Review 17 (2), 331–360. 
Gassen, J., Sellhorn, T., 2006. Applying IFRS in Germany – determinants and consequences. 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 58 (4), 365–386. 
 128 
 Gerakos, J., Lang, M., Maffett, M., 2013. Post-listing performance and private sector 
regulation: The experience of London’s Alternative Investment Market. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 56 (2-3), 189–215. 
Goetzmann, W. N, Kumar, A., 2008. Equity portfolio diversification. Review of Finance 12 
(3), 433–463.  
Günther, N., Gegenfurtner, B., Kaserer, C., Achleitner, A.-C., 2009. International financial 
reporting standards and earnings quality: The myth of voluntary vs. mandatory adoption, 
CEFS Working Paper No 2009-09. 
Maffett, M., 2012. Financial reporting opacity and informed trading by international 
institutional investors. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54 (2–3), 201–220. 
Murphy, A. B., 1999. Firm characteristics of Swiss companies that utilize international 
accounting standards. The International Journal of Accounting 34 (1), 121–131. 
Peek, E., Cuijpers, R., Buijink, W., 2010. Creditors’ and shareholders’ reporting demands in 
public versus private firms: Evidence from Europe. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
27 (1), 49–91. 
Pownall, G., Wieczynska M., 2012. Deviations from the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union: Implementation, enforcement, incentives, and compliance. Working 
Paper.  
Rahman, A. R., Tay, T. M., Ong, B. T., Cai, S., 2007. Quarterly reporting in a voluntary 
disclosure environment: Its benefits, drawbacks and determinants. The International 
Journal of Accounting 42 (3), 416–442. 
Vismara, S., Paleari, S., Ritter, J. R., 2012. Europe’s second markets for small companies. 
European Financial Management 18 (3), 352–388.  
Wu, S. J, Zhang, I. X, 2009. The voluntary adoption of internationally recognized accounting 
standards and firm internal performance evaluation. The Accounting Review 84 (4), 
1281–1309.  
Yip, R., Young, D., 2012. Does Mandatory IFRS adoption improve information 
comparability? The Accounting Review 87 (5), 1767–1789. 
 129 
